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A yeAr Of eXPeCTATiOnS AnD SUrPriSeS
this is the sixth year that the 
civilitas foundation publishes 
its annual report. we look back 
at the past year and attempt to 
assess and analyze Armenia’s 
foreign policy, domestic 
developments and trends, as well 
as the economic situation in the 
country – all within the context 
of a changing global and regional 
environment.
with this report, as with previous ones, we have 
tried not only to identify the most important 
events of the year, but also to focus on trends 
and structural changes. the year was replete with 
expectations on all sides. 
in a year with two elections – presidential and 
Yerevan municipal – hopes and expectations 
were high that this time, something would be 
different, and the elections would be perceived 
as legitimate, regardless of who came out on top. 
After all, in the absence of a strong opposition 
candidate, it was reasonable to expect that there 
would not be a need to utilize administrative 
resources to guarantee a re-election. this 
expectation was not met, but there was a surprise 
– the opposition candidate received more than 
one-third of the vote and that was sufficient 
for the public to want and expect a different 
outcome. it did not happen.
 the international community, and Armenia’s own 
citizens, expected that Armenia would continue 
on the path it had chosen nearly two decades 
ago – to more deeply integrate within european 
institutions. Yet, at the last minute, in what could 
only be described as a surprise to all, Armenia’s 
president chose to take Armenia into the russian-
led customs union. the eternal question, russia 
or the west, seemed to have found its answer. 
if in the past, Armenia had been able to sustain 
normal and pragmatic relations with all three 
geopolitical centers — moscow, Brussels and 
washington — and balance their interests to 
Armenia’s benefit, that was no longer to be 
expected.  in the eyes of a surprised west, and 
an expectant russia, Armenia was no longer a 
predictable and reliable partner.
in 2013, the poor and the unemployed expected 
some improvement in their lives. the president 
had promised seven percent growth. it was not a 
surprise that that goal was not achieved, nor was 
it a surprise that no one was held accountable.
opinion polls show that, given the opportunity, 
hundreds of thousands of Armenians would leave 
Armenia. official statistics confirm this. in the 
first nine months of 2013, more than 120,000 
people left and have not returned. during the last 
six years, on the current government’s watch, 
every tenth citizen has left the country, either 
temporarily or forever.
there is no indication that, in the coming year, 
expectations ought to be different. there is no 
policy in place to decrease the levels of poverty 
or unemployment, or to try to halt emigration or 
encourage in-migration. neither Armenia-turkey 
relations nor the Karabakh conflict expect to be 
resolved. relations with georgia are not expected 
to markedly change.
if there are surprises, they will be in the realm of 
domestic politics. more active civic engagement, 
the formation of a more resolute opposition, and 
a more varied set of demands of the authorities – 
these are the surprises many hope for. 
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DiViSiVe CHOiCeS
2013 was the year when the 
foreign policy focus of each of 
the three south caucasus states 
shifted so significantly that by 
year’s end, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and georgia were left with even 
less in common than they had 
before.
Yerevan, Baku and tbilisi were preoccupied with 
redefining relations with russia and the european 
union. the process was convoluted, with several 
unexpected turns and the outcomes differed 
greatly. thus the two international crises much 
less than a few hundred kilometers away — the 
civil war in syria and iran’s nuclear program 
— receded into the background. And perhaps 
because of those crises, international attention 
was not on the caucasus.
in 2013, the world’s attention was focused on the 
continuing conflict and violence in the countries 
which had embraced the Arab spring. in addition 
to egypt, and to some extent iraq, Libya, 
Yemen, Lebanon and tunisia, for whom 2013 
was an unstable year, Afghanistan and pakistan 
maintained their own familiar unstability, and 
even turkey underwent serious internal shock.   
But the focus was on syria where the world 
watched in dread as more than a hundred 
thousand were killed, and millions deported or 
sought refuge.  
syria’s nearly 50,000-strong Armenian 
community as well as those around the world who 
trace their roots to syria, were directly affected 
as, nearly 100 years after the first world war, the 
imposed patchwork peace began to break down.
Armenia, and to some extent Karabakh as well, 
continued to receive immigrants from syria, 
estimated to number around 10,000.  the syrian 
Armenian community count has dwindled to 
some 20,000 remaining in damascus and Aleppo 
where war wages ceaselessly, as well as in the 
comparatively peaceful Kurdish-controlled city of 
Kamishli and the Alewi-controlled seacoast.   
the end of the year also saw tensions rise in 
ukraine, when hundreds of thousands of people 
took to the streets in Kiev and in western 
ukrainian cities, demanding that the government 
follow through with their initial intention to sign 
the Association Agreement with the european 
union. this, after the ukrainian president did an 
about-face, under pressure from moscow, and 
refused to sign just days before the european 
union summit in Vilnius on november 28-29. 
calls for the president’s and the government’s 
resignation soon followed.
GEORGIA
moscow had made clear in late 2012 its hopes 
that the defeat of president mikheil saakashvili’s 
united national movement (unm) in the october 
parliamentary election would pave the way for 
more constructive, less strained and hostile 
relations.
the new georgian government headed by 
billionaire Bidzina ivanishvili adopted a pragmatic 
approach with regard to economic cooperation 
while maintaining the unm’s unyielding position 
with regard to the breakaway georgian regions of 
Abkhazia and south ossetia.
Veteran georgian diplomat and former Ambassador 
to moscow Zurab Abashidze and russian deputy 
foreign minister grigorii Karasin held four rounds 
of talks that, in Karasin’s words, put an end 
to “the epoch of maniacal enmity instilled by 
the previous leadership.”  in moscow, president 
Vladimir putin received the georgian patriarch ilia 
ii, and in davos, russian prime minister dimitrii 
medvedev met with georgian prime minister 
ivanishvili.
moscow lifted the ban imposed in 2006 on the 
import of georgian wine, mineral water and 
agricultural goods. As a result, georgia’s trade 
turnover with russia grew by 38 percent. the 
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number of russian visas granted to georgian 
citizens increased by 40 percent.  
still, like the previous georgian leadership, 
ivanishvili’s government, too, steadfastly rejected  
the idea of signing formal agreements on the non-
use of force with Abkhazia and south ossetia. At 
the same time, tbilisi continued to rule out the 
formal restoration of diplomatic ties with russia 
(which were severed in the wake of the August 
2008 war) unless russia revokes its recognition 
of Abkhazia and south ossetia as independent 
sovereign states.
consequently, no russian officials were invited 
to the inauguration on november 17 of mikheil 
saakashvili’s successor as president, giorgi 
margvelashvili.
those elections were competitive and highly 
rancorous. the georgian dream became reality. 
margvelashvili won in the first round, with 
more than 60 percent of the vote. All observing 
organizations — european and russian — assessed 
the elections to be free and fair.
the elections were preceded by months 
of bitter charges in both directions. the 
saakashvili camp, and saakashvili himself, 
frequently accused the new leadership of 
not being sufficiently western-leaning, and 
sabotaging the spirit of the revolution. in 
turn, saakashvili and many members of his 
team were charged — both rhetorically and 
legally — with corruption, improper use of 
administrative resources, prisoner abuse and 
other infringements of power. so intent was 
the ivanishvili government in its pursuit of 
the former officials that european leaders 
cautioned the new government that they might 
be sacrificing their future by so zealously 
retaliating against the past.
still, the new georgian administration, like the 
previous one, remained focused on european 
integration. they succeeded in concluding the 
european union Association Agreement negotiations 
and actually initialing the agreement with the 
leadership of the eu in Vilnius, at the eu eastern 
partnership summit in november. thus georgia 
became the only country in the caucasus to 
embark on this next step in european integration.
georgia either was not subjected to the same 
intensity of pressure that russia brought to 
bear on ukraine or Armenia, or the georgian 
authorities had become accustomed to ignoring 
the russian factor in their calculations.
in the midst of domestic tensions, an uncertain 
transition, and regional pressures, georgia’s 
economy stalled. in 2013, gdp growth was a bare 
two percent.
Helping georgia manage the problem of 
heightened expectations and reduced growth is 
its extremely low military budget, which stood 
at $360 million in 2013. georgia had engaged in 
a large-scale military build-up prior to the 2008 
war, when its annual military spending reached 
$1 billion, with the country purchasing offensive 
weapons such as aircraft, tanks and artillery. 
the build-up proved insufficient against russian 
military. georgia recognized that the lack of 
western military support and russia’s establishing 
permanent military bases in Abkhazia and south 
ossetia, made any future offensive military action 
by georgia effectively meaningless.
following the war, georgia began to decrease 
spending and re-focus on less expensive 
acquisitions, such as air defense and anti-armor 
weapons. And in a move so far unprecedented 
in the caucasus, the new georgian leadership 
announced plans to sell off much of the 
country’s armor and aircraft holdings to reduce 
maintenance costs and raise funds for defensive 
military needs. georgia also scaled back ambitious 
saakashvili-era defense industry programs and 
reportedly sought to sell its soviet-era aircraft 
manufacturing plant to Azerbaijan.
meanwhile, georgia’s multi-faceted bilateral 
cooperation with turkey, and trilateral 
Armenia, and to some extent 
Karabakh as well, continued 
to receive immigrants from 
Syria, estimated to number 
around 10,000
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cooperation between georgia, Azerbaijan and 
turkey grew. Visiting tbilisi in february, turkish 
prime minister recep tayyip erdogan said 
georgian-turkish relations should serve as an 
example for the other countries of the region.
in the first 10 months of 2013, turkey was 
georgia’s biggest trading partner, with $1.2 billion 
in total trade, about 14.2 percent of georgia’s total 
trade. turkey held the same status in 2012, when 
trade volume was slightly higher, at $1.3 billion in 
the same period in 2012,
the foreign ministers of georgia, Azerbaijan 
and turkey met in Batumi in march to build on 
the trilateral cooperation declaration signed the 
previous year. georgian foreign minister maia 
panjikidze singled out the two countries as among 
georgia’s most important regional economic 
partners.  
the cordial relations georgia enjoyed with 
iran in recent years cooled in July after tbilisi 
unilaterally revoked the 2010 agreement allowing 
iranians to visit georgia without a visa. the 
georgian authorities also froze the georgian 
bank accounts of some 150 iranian persons 
or commercial entities to whom un sanctions 
apply after rumors that iran was circumventing 
sanctions with georgia’s assistance.
AZERBAIJAN
prior to Azerbaijan’s presidential election in 
october, Armenian president serzh sargsyan had 
said that Azerbaijani president ilham Aliyev’s 
reelection would probably be most convenient for 
Armenia.
And that’s what happened. ilham Aliyev won for 
the third time after inheriting the presidency 
from his father in 2003. He received 85 percent 
of the vote, to opposition candidate camil 
Hasanli’s six percent.
this was the first time that the two opposition 
parties had fielded a joint candidate. Hasanli, 
a historian, became the flag bearer when the 
russians refused to release rustam ibragimbekov 
of russian citizenship and the Azerbaijani 
authorities barred the celebrated film maker on 
the grounds that he has dual citizenship.
the european union and the osce - odiHr as 
well as western countries, including the us, 
stated that the elections were not in line with 
international standards.
Aliyev’s new government did not include safar 
Abiyev who had been defense minister for the 
last 18 years, and who was perceived as among 
the most corrupt. Artur rasizade, 78 years old, 
remained prime minister, a post he has held 
since 1996.
following Azerbaijan’s refusal in december 2012 
to renew russia’s lease of the gabala radar station, 
the country’s leadership continued to combine 
pragmatism and assertiveness in their approach 
to russian-Azerbaijani bilateral relations. the  
pragmatism was evident during russian president 
Vladimir putin’s August visit to Baku, during 
which two important agreements were signed 
between the state-owned russian oil company 
rosneft and Azerbaijan’s socAr. Azerbaijan has 
also placed orders for russian weaponry to the 
value of $1 billion. the first foreign visit by Zakir 
gasanov, who replaced veteran defense minister 
Abiyev in october, was to moscow.
the assertiveness was demonstrated on the eve 
of that same visit, by the detention of members 
of the moscow-sponsored federal Lezgin national 
Autonomy, a body the Azerbaijani leadership 
perceives as an instrument russia could use 
against Azerbaijan’s own Lezgin minority.
despite religious and cultural commonalities, 
there are serious contradictions in iran-Azerbaijan 
Tbilisi continued to rule out 
the formal restoration of 
diplomatic ties with Russia 
unless Russia revokes its 
recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia as independent 
sovereign states
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relations, some of which are historic, others 
political. Azerbaijan is a turkic country, but 
unlike turkey where the majority population 
is sunni, 60 percent of Azerbaijan’s population 
is shia muslim. iran, of course, is the cradle of 
the shia arm of islam. thus, Baku continuously 
accuses iran in trying to extend its influence over 
Azerbaijan, through religion.
disagreement over the status of the caspian 
sea is another area of tension between the 
two countries, which hold opposing positions. 
Another area of discord is Azerbaijan’s territorial 
aspirations over certain regions of northern iran, 
which is populated by millions of ethnic Azeris.
Baku remains convinced that despite public 
statements and votes cast in international fora, 
tehran is backing Armenians in the Karabakh 
issue. tehran, in turn, has clearly said that 
Azerbaijan is supporting israel. Besides buying 
armaments from them, Azerbaijan is perceived as 
the west’s and israel’s best friend in the region, 
primed to strike against iran, if necessary. 
there were no high level visits between the two. 
ilham Aliyev’s chief of staff ramiz mehtiyev, 
considered to wield a great deal of power in the 
Azerbaijani system, visited president mahmud 
Ahmadinejad in march. there were practically no 
reports about the outcome of the meeting.
for Azerbaijan, the year’s major accomplishment 
was the signing, on december 16, of the 
agreement to enter into phase 2 of the shah 
deniz gas field development and exploitation. 
this will signal the start of some $25 billion 
investment on the gas field itself, and another $20 
for the pipelines which will carry the gas through 
turkey to europe, beginning in 2019. A total of 
$46 billion in global investments will begin to 
see a return no earlier than 2029. sixteen billion 
cubic meters of gas will travel from Azerbaijan 
through georgia to turkey, which will keep six 
billion and transport the rest to europe. europe’s 
annual gas demand in 2019 is expected to reach 
490 billion cubic meters. thus Azerbaijan will 
fulfill some two percent of europe’s needs.
in parallel, Azerbaijan considerably expanded its 
lobbying in both the us and europe. the Azerbaijan 
America Alliance (AAA) led by the son of 
Azerbaijan’s transport minister – one of the richest 
people in the country – held two massive events. 
in may, a huge American contingent that included 
former advisors to president obama, eleven sitting 
members of congress and dozens of state-level 
officials from more than 40 us states, descended on 
Baku. AAA held a follow-up party in washington in 
october with four us senators and 13 congressmen 
co-hosting the “celebration of relations.”
Azerbaijan’s european efforts are led by the sons 
of its minister of emergencies, reputed to be 
even richer than the transport minister. A mid-
year report by a european think tank referred 
to ‘caviar diplomacy’ to explain the sources of 
Azerbaijan’s support in european institutions. 
TURKEY
in the absence of any tangible successes in 
relations with neighbors, turkey’s Justice 
and development party (AKp) embarked on a 
reconciliation process with turkey’s own Kurdish 
population and the Kurdish workers’ party, and 
also ventured into direct relations with iraqi 
Kurdistan, thus complicating further its relations 
with Baghdad’s ruling shiites.
in november, in the southeastern turkish city 
of diyarbakir, which the Kurds consider the 
capital of Kurdistan, turkish prime minister 
regep tayyip erdogan hosted masud Barzani, and 
Still, the new Georgian 
administration, like the 
previous one, remained 
focused on European 
integration. They succeeded 
in concluding the European 
Union Association Agreement 
negotiations and actually 
initialing the agreement with 
the leadership of the EU in 
Vilnius
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welcomed him as the leader of the iraqi Kurdistan 
region, thus using the term ‘Kurdistan’ publicly. 
this was the first of a string of public uses of the 
term. diyarbakir mayor osman Baydemir even 
spoke of turkish Kurdistan on television. He said 
erdogan’s statement was not revolutionary, rather 
it removed the shame of the past.
the initiative to resolve tensions with turkey’s 
Kurds had started early in the year, when erdogan 
initiated negotiations with the incarcerated 
Kurdish leader Abdullah ocalan. As a result, 
during the year, there was not a single casualty as 
part of  Kurdish-turkish confrontations.
the turkish authorities reached out to the syrian 
branch of the Kurdish workers’ party as well, 
thus establishing a dialog not just with the Kurds 
of turkey, but also with those of iraq and syria, 
going counter to the central governments in 
Bagdad and damascus.
turkish-israeli relations thawed when israeli 
prime minister Benjamin netanyahu apologized 
in march for the loss of life in the mavi marmara 
incident in 2010. on the other hand, relations 
with egypt became heated when the army 
removed president mohamed morsi in July and 
fired on the moslem Brotherhood. erdogan called 
it a massacre. relations with Lebanon also soured 
when two turkish pilots were kidnapped in Beirut 
as a result of the syrian conflict.
And there were new domestic challenges. in 
June, major demonstrations in dozens of turkish 
cities shocked prime minister erdogan and 
his administration. they did not know how to 
deal with calls for democratization that arose 
from government’s unvetted construction 
plans in istanbul’s gezi park. the international 
community’s conclusion was that the authorities 
were not prepared to listen to the demonstrators 
and used disproportionate force.
By year’s end, the erdogan administration found 
itself under even greater pressure. police and 
prosecutors focused on ministers and others in 
government, charging them with corruption. 
erdogan called this a conspiracy against himself 
and his party, and proceeded to relieve hundreds 
of officials in the law-enforcement sector of their 
positions. erdogan insisted that the prosecution was 
instigated by foreign governments. But his primary 
focus were the followers of fethullah gulen, part of 
an international religious and social movement with 
millions of followers within and outside turkey. this 
was not the first time during the year that erdogan 
challenged the movement’s foothold in society, 
but was certainly one with huge ramifications for 
the next several months and for the turkish local 
elections scheduled for march 2014.
the demonstrations and the government’s 
response adversely affected turkey-european 
union relations as well. several planned visits 
were cancelled. the opening of a new chapter in 
turkey-eu accession negotiations were postponed. 
the european commission’s progress report on 
the accession process was released in october. it 
was critical of the gezi park events, unfulfilled 
promises and reforms, but welcomed the 
democratization package which the government 
had made public. the package — one of the most 
important initiatives of erdogan’s government 
— consists of proposals some of which are 
unprecedented. many linguistic, educational, 
social obstacles and taboos are lifted for Kurds 
and Kurdish communities. the proposed changes 
affect the turkish population as well.
in the context of such deep and significant 
overtures to the Kurdish community, Ankara’s 
continued resistance to all things Armenian 
remains problematic.
the resolution five years later of the ergenekon 
cases, where several hundred high level officials 
Following Azerbaijan’s 
refusal in December 2012 
to renew Russia’s lease of 
the Gabala radar station, 
the country’s leadership 
continued to combine 
pragmatism and assertiveness 
in their approach to Russian-
Azerbaijani bilateral relations
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were questioned, and more than 100 convicted, 
in no way helped ease the tension that continues 
over the legal process aimed at resolving the 
Hrant dink assassination of 2007. Although dink’s 
attorneys insist that there is a direct link with the 
ergenekon plotters and those still in office, the 
government has twice shut down such inquiry.   
for the Armenians of istanbul, it was another 
year of contradictions. Being Armenian in 
turkey remains challenging. on the one 
hand, the government returned to community 
institutions certain property and assets which 
had been seized half a century ago. on the 
other hand, in the samatya district of istanbul 
— a highly Armenian populated neighborhood 
which has for centuries been home to the 
patriarchate of the Armenian church — 
Armenians became the target of violent attacks. 
two were killed. the authorities arrested an 
Armenian who said in court that he was not 
responsible. istanbul’s christian churches, too, 
were attacked, the Armenian patriarchate’s 
mother church among them. while turkey’s 
Human rights Association insisted that the 
crimes were racially motivated, turkish officials 
rejected that possibility.
April 24, the day marking the beginning of the 
1915 genocide against Armenians perpetrated 
by the ottoman rulers, was commemorated 
in istanbul and several other cities as well. 
this is not the first year that various turkish 
individuals and organizations have undertaken 
such demonstrative memorials. in istanbul, the 
participants numbered more than 1,000 people, 
including a number of Armenians from the 
diaspora.
in June, in istanbul’s Beyazit square, a small 
group of turkish advocates and members of the 
social democrat Hunchakian party (from Armenia 
and diaspora) commemorated the hanging in 1915 
of 20 prominent figures of the Hunchakian party.   
 this year, the fourth year in a row, a church 
service was held in the Holy cross church on 
Akhtamar island in Van, although attendance 
was lower than in years past. for the first time 
since 1915, the sacrament of baptism was also 
performed. six people from Armenia and turkey 
were baptized during the september service.
for the first time, there was a protest on the 
occasion of the ceremony on Akhtamar, and 
the organizers were not turks but Azerbaijanis. 
four turkish-Azerbaijani organizations, including 
members of a dutch-Azerbaijani cultural 
organization organized a demonstration not on the 
island, but on the road directly across the island, 
commemorating the “50 moslem women and people 
of Van who were killed by Armenian terror groups.”
Just two days later, another church service was held, 
this time in diyarbakir, in what is considered to be 
the largest Armenian church in the middle east — 
the st. giragos Armenian Apostolic church. this was 
the first service in 98 years and was attended by 
hundreds from within turkey and abroad. Kurds, too, 
attended, most notably the mayor of diyarbakir. He 
had been instrumental in helping raise government 
funds for part of the $3 million renovation (also 
supported by Armenians from istanbul and the 
diaspora.) per a 2011 law, the turkish government 
is returning to religious minorities the assets and 
properties seized from them in 1936. and as part of 
this. the diyarbakir Armenian church has received 17 
of the more than 190 properties seized.
september also saw the erection, also in 
diyarbakir, of a memorial to a common 
conscience for the pain experienced by turks, 
Kurds, Arabs, Armenians and Assyrians before and 
after the creation of the republic of turkey.
NAGORNO KARABAKH 
in 2013, those engaged in the nagorno Karabakh 
conflict focused not so much on seeking solutions 
For Azerbaijan, the year’s 
major accomplishment was 
the signing, on December 
16, of the agreement 
to enter into Phase 2 
of the Shah Deniz gas 
field development and 
exploitation
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for a lasting peace as they were in acquiring 
armaments. ceasefire infractions have become 
common not only in the Karabakh conflict area, 
but all along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. 
in the northeastern noyemberyan-Kazakh region, 
the interstate Yerevan-tbilisi highway which 
lies outside Armenia’s boundaries but has been 
under the control of Armenian forces, was closed 
several times in July, because Azerbaijani sniper 
fire had made the road unsafe. in november 
and december, the road remained shut and 
instead traffic was diverted to a secondary road 
farther west. the same set of events took place 
in october on the Berd-ijevan road, where 
one person was killed and several soldiers 
and civilians were wounded. oddly, similar 
ceasefire violations have taken place along 
Armenia’s southwestern border with Azerbaijan’s 
nakhichevan exclave, where everything had been 
peaceful even during the military conflict itself as 
well as after the 1994 ceasefire.
in 2014, Azerbaijan will spend $3.8 billion on 
armaments — an amount significantly higher than 
the combined budgets of the republic of Armenia 
and that of nagorno Karabakh. in June, on 
Azerbaijan’s Army day, president Aliyev pointed 
out that in 2003 Azerbaijan’s military budget 
was $163 million. thus in 10 years, military 
appropriations have grown by 23 times.
Azerbaijan bought $1 billion in military equipment 
from russia, including the offensive smercH 
multiple-rocket launchers. during putin’s visit to 
Baku, it was announced that Azerbaijan has bought 
$4 billion in armaments from russia since 2010.
in response to Armenia’s concerns, russia insisted 
that russian arms sales to Azerbaijan do not 
disrupt the military balance.
Visiting Karabakh in late August, Armenia’s prime 
minister tigran sargsyan likewise claimed a 
dramatic rise in Armenian arms acquisitions. “in 
the last three years we have acquired as much 
weaponry as we did in the previous 20 years,” he 
said. At year’s end, when he visited military posts 
on the frontline, he announced that the Armenian 
army would soon have armaments the likes of 
which they haven’t seen in the past.
russia has made “maintaining the balance” 
a rhetorical centerpiece of its policy on 
Karabakh. “Balance” in the russian government’s 
understanding is selling its most modern – 
and most expensive – military equipment to 
Azerbaijan, transferring second-hand but fairly 
decent materials to Armenia for almost free and 
substantially reinforcing the russian military base 
in Armenia, thus deterring Azerbaijan from using 
its newly acquired arsenal.
until recently the base had a decidedly defensive 
posture focused on the upgrades of its air defense 
component that since the early 2000s included 
the long-range s-300 surface-to-air missile 
systems and a squadron of mig-29 air superiority 
fighters. earlier this year, russian officials also let 
it be known that the base now includes medium-
range iskander surface-to-surface missiles. with 
a range of up to 400 kilometers, Armenia-based 
iskanders (not yet shown publicly) can strike any 
target between Yerevan and Baku with deadly 
accuracy and thus present an ultimate deterrence 
weapon in the Armenian-Azerbaijani standoff. the 
russian base now also has a highly destructive, 
long-range (90 km) smerch multiple-launch 
rocket system and a mi-24 attack helicopter 
squadron.
significantly, in an october 2013 interview with 
the official newspaper of the russian ministry of 
defense, the base commander colonel Andrey 
ruzinsky made clear that his base could be 
engaged in case of Azerbaijan’s aggression against 
nagorno Karabakh, even though it falls formally 
outside russia’s treaty obligations to Armenia. in 
In the absence of any 
tangible successes in 
relations with neighbors, 
Turkey’s Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) 
embarked on a reconciliation 
process with Turkey’s own 
Kurdish population and the 
Kurdish Workers’ Party
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effect, as was the case with the withdrawal from 
georgian bases a year before the 2008 war, the 
withdrawal of russian military personnel from 
the radar base in Azerbaijan in late 2012 makes 
a hypothetical threat of russian military action 
against Azerbaijan more credible.
 At the same time, beginning in 2011, russia 
has lifted most restrictions on weapons sales 
to Azerbaijan, supplying the country with 
modernized s-300 sAms, two dozen mi-35 
(upgraded mi-24) combat helicopters and most 
recently nearly 100 t-90 tanks, and modern 
artillery and short-range air defense systems. 
total Azerbaijani contracting from russia has 
exceeded $4 billion, making russia the main 
weapons supplier to Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan 
one of the major buyers of russian equipment. 
the only restrictions that russia still appears to 
maintain with regard to Azerbaijan are on sales 
of combat aircraft, naval and missile systems. 
Awash in cash, Azerbaijan has made additional 
purchases from israel, turkey and south Korea, 
also estimated in the billions of dollars, including 
dozens of unmanned aerial vehicles (uAVs), 
artillery and air defense systems, and even 
submarines.
outmatched in cash, Armenia is increasingly left 
reliant on russia for pre-empting an Azerbaijani 
attack. russian military transfers or deeply 
subsidized sales to Armenia in recent years have 
included s-300s, other missile systems, mi-24s 
and ground equipment, and can be estimated 
to be in excess of $1 billion. At the same time, 
not all has been smooth in military cooperation 
with russia. Armenia has turned to countries like 
china, ukraine, poland and slovakia to fill in the 
gaps for its military needs, including, according to 
some sources, the chinese Ar1A equivalent of the 
smerch missiles.
while Azerbaijan still has no ready capacity 
to defeat Armenian forces on the ground, it 
has certainly amassed substantial resources to 
cause significant Armenian casualties if it were 
to initiate hostilities in the form of a massive 
artillery strike. Azerbaijan’s air force capabilities 
are too limited to penetrate extensive Armenian 
air defenses. Armenia’s counter-strike capabilities 
– particularly in the form of Armenia’s own 
arsenal of scud and tochka ballistic missiles and 
long-range multiple launch rocket systems – and 
especially the notion that russian forces might 
get involved is what makes any major escalation 
in Karabakh so unappealing to Azerbaijan.        
As a result, in this no-peace no-war situation, 
the Azerbaijani leadership is likely to continue to 
resort to lower-intensity and lower-risk activities, 
such as what has become regular sniper fire 
and less frequent aerial maneuvers and special 
operations, to keep military pressure on Armenia 
and nagorno Karabakh. for now, Armenian forces 
have contended with such pressure along the Line 
of contact fairly well. still, soldiers continue to die 
as a result of enemy fire. Baku refuses to pull back 
the snipers “so long as the war has not ended,” 
according to the Azerbaijani defense ministry.
the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents had 
one meeting in 2013 — in november, in Vienna. 
this was their first meeting since the January 
2012 sochi tete-a-tete. the post-meeting 
announcement in Vienna promised nothing 
more than more meetings. the absence of the 
word ‘madrid’ was noticeable, which may be 
indication of the continuing effort to sideline the 
madrid document of 2007 and its provision for 
a referendum by the people of Karabakh. the 
other change worthy of notice is that Azerbaijan’s 
militaristic rhetoric seemed to have toned down.
the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan 
met several times, in what seemed to be meetings 
for the sake of meeting — in January in paris, in 
may in Krakow, in July in Vienna, in september in 
new York and in december in Kiev.
The demonstrations and 
the government’s response 
adversely affected Turkey-
European Union relations as 
well. Several planned visits 
were cancelled. The opening 
of a new chapter in Turkey-
EU accession negotiations 
were postponed
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in addition, the co-chairs of the osce minsk 
group also met with each minister separately 
once during the year. together, they made five 
visits to the region — in march, April, may, 
november and december. in september, the 
newly-appointed American co-chair, Ambassador 
James warlick, visited Baku, Yerevan and 
stepanakert. in Baku and Yerevan, he transmitted 
us president Barack obama’s letter calling on the 
sides to bring new effort to bear in the search 
for peace. Ambassador warlick is the first us 
co-chair whose portfolio is solely the Karabakh 
conflict.
during each regional visit, the co-chairs also 
met with the authorities of nagorno Karabakh, in 
stepanakert.  the stepanakert airport is a regular 
agenda item at these meetings. the newly-built 
airport has been standing idle for two years, 
because of Azerbaijan’s threats to destroy any 
airplane attempting to use it, per a law passed in 
January on “the use of Azerbaijan’s Air space.” 
during this visit, the us and french co-chairs 
held a rare meeting with Karabakh’s civil society 
and non-governmental representatives, at the 
stepanakert press club.
in June, at the g8 summit in ireland, the 
presidents of the three minsk group co-chair 
countries — obama, putin and françois Hollande 
of france — issued a statement expressing “deep 
regret that, rather than trying to find a solution 
based upon mutual interests, the parties have 
continued to seek one-sided advantage in the 
negotiation process.” this was the sixth such joint 
statement made by the heads of state during the 
life of the conflict.
in october, the european parliament passed a 
resolution calling for a solution to the conflict 
that would correspond with the four un 
security council resolutions of 1993 and the 
joint statement of the presidents of the co-chair 
countries made at the 2009 g8 l’Aquila summit.  
in december, at the osce ministerial meeting in 
Kiev, a joint statement by the heads of delegations 
of the osce minsk group co-chair countries 
as well as the foreign ministers of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan called on the sides to consider 
measures to decrease tension in the region.
turkey continued to adopt a one-sided 
approach and support Azerbaijan’s position 
in the negotiations process. during the third 
turkic council summit meeting held in gabala, 
Azerbaijan, in August, turkish president 
Abdullah gul went so far as to say that he hoped 
that one day that meeting would take place in 
nagorno Karabakh.
Armenians and Azerbaijanis, themselves, instead 
of looking for fair and balanced solutions 
that would meet the minimal needs of the 
three sides, are instead focusing on ways to 
propagandize recent history. international 
forums and meetings are used primarily for 
that purpose. Azerbaijan is spending millions to 
mark the events in Khojalu, accusing Armenian 
military forces of deliberately killing civilians, 
at the height of the military conflict. Azerbaijan 
attempts to turn those commemorations into 
anti-Armenian actions, and present them in 
various state or local legislatures as premeditated 
destruction by the Armenian side. As a result, 
some countries and states did in fact recognize 
those 1992 events as evidence of one-sided 
Armenian atrocities.
At the french national Assembly, Azerbaijanis 
refused to honor a moment of silence in memory 
of the Armenian victims of the sumgait pogroms 
carried out in february 1988 in response to 
the start of the democratic movement. the 
Azerbaijanis were removed from the building after 
fisticuffs ensued with Armenians. the french 
foreign ministry rebuked the participants.
For the Armenians of 
Istanbul, it was another 
year of contradictions. 
Being Armenian in Turkey 
remains challenging. On the 
one hand, the government 
returned to community 
institutions certain property 
and assets which had been 
seized half a century ago
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Karabakh’s representatives have undertaken 
diplomatic steps to achieve Karabakh’s recognition 
and to establish friendship groups with various 
parliaments. in france, a friendship group was 
established with the participation of members 
of the national Assembly as well as political and 
intellectual figures. in Lithuania, the seim formed a 
friendship group. Azerbaijan sent formal diplomatic 
notes to Lithuania and france, in protest.
in the us, the states of maine and Louisiana, 
and the california cities of fresno and Highland, 
all passed resolutions recognizing Karabakh’s 
independence or its right to develop its free and 
independent status.
Armenia’s national Assembly again took up the 
issue of Armenia’s recognition of Karabakh’s 
independence. this is the third time this 
discussion has taken place, and the third time 
that it did not pass.  the parliamentarians 
who voted in favor — 11 in all — were mostly 
from the Armenian revolutionary federation - 
dashnaktsutyun and from the Heritage party, 
which had authored the bill. the rest did not 
participate in the vote.
Just as the frequency of official contacts has 
diminished, so have contacts between ngos and 
other civil society actors. indeed, a document 
presented (but not passed) in the Azerbaijani 
parliament threatened to make illegal any 
cooperation with the Armenian side, without 
Baku’s official permission. even in the case 
of prisoners exchange, Azerbaijan makes the 
interactions difficult.
As part of its effort to minimize international 
interaction with the Armenian side, Azerbaijan 
has both expanded and publicized its ‘black list’ 
of officials, journalists, artists and others who visit 
Karabakh. the 335-name list that the Azerbaijani 
mfA proudly displayed soon became the object of 
derision, however, by international figures who 
had visited and whose names were missing, or 
by others who announced they would soon visit 
Karabakh, simply for the ‘honor’ of being included. 
Baku’s use of public relations firms and 
techniques is indiscriminatory and international. 
from artistic venues to commercials on 
international television outlets, it promotes the 
positive, while at the same time blaming and 
punishing those officials whose countries ‘allow’ 
the publication of less-than-positive articles 
in their press. several years ago, us diplomats 
in Baku were punished when the washington 
post published a piece about the wealth of the 
youngest of Aliyev’s children. this year, russian 
diplomats were punished for novosti’s piece by 
Vadim dubnov entitled, “in 25 years, Karabakh 
has learned not to be recognized.” unlike the 
washington post, novosti removed the  article 
from its site.
Azerbaijan demonstrates no interest in 
cooperation of any kind with the Armenian side. 
when the authorities in stepanakert announced 
that they are ready to discuss with Baku issues 
related to the joint use of the sarsang reservoir 
and the tartar river in Karabakh’s north, and to 
making water available to Azerbaijan, there was 
no response.
not only is there no indication of readiness 
to cooperate, but Azerbaijan has adopted new 
methods of vilifying Armenians. Azerbaijani 
writer Akram Ailisli fell victim to Baku’s official 
ire upon the publication of his novel stone 
dreams. it’s a story of Agulis, the Armenian 
region where the author was born, and whose 
Armenian population was decimated 90 years 
earlier. the heroes of stone dreams are 
Azerbaijanis living in Baku in the 1980s, at the 
time that the massacres of Armenians were 
taking place in sumgait and Baku. the novel 
was published in a russian literary journal, 
druzba narodov.
In June, in Istanbul’s Beyazit 
Square, a small group of 
Turkish advocates and 
members of the Social 
Democrat Hunchakian Party 
(from Armenia and Diaspora) 
commemorated the hanging in 
1915 of 20 prominent figures 
of the Hunchakian Party
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president Aliyev retracted Ailisli’s national award 
as a man of letters. Ailisli was rebuked strongly 
in the Azerbaijani parliament. He was accused 
of denigrating the integrity of the Azerbaijani 
people. organized protests and book burnings 
were accompanied by calls of treason and 
members of his family were removed from their 
positions. even Azerbaijan’s religious leader joined 
the melee and called him godless and a heretic.
despite the officially-sanctioned attacks on his 
person and his work, Ailisli repeatedly insisted 
that the events described in stone dreams 
correspond absolutely to truth and real events. 
He said the book was written not for Armenians, 
but for Azeris. nevertheless, three Armenian 
publishers published the book in Armenian within 
months of the russian publication.
Armenian publications are not allowed into 
Azerbaijan; they are labeled “extremist literature.” 
no other kinds of Armenian products are allowed 
in either. this is in stark contrast to the situation 
less than 10 years ago when Armenian cognac and 
cigarettes could be found on Baku’s store shelves.
for internal Karabakh politics, it was a good 
year. freedom House placed Karabakh in the 
‘partly free’ category, as opposed to the previous 
few years’ ‘not free.’  As a consequence, or as 
further evidence of the improvement, in the 
village of Khachen, in late february, a new 
political party was formed, vocal in its opposition 
to the ruling party.
to strengthen Karabakh’s economic potential and 
accessibility, as well as motivated by security 
concerns, a 116 kilometer (50 mile) road will 
be constructed in the coming years between 
Vardenis, in Armenia’s east, near Lake sevan, to 
martakert in Karabakh’s north. the focus of the 
government’s Armenia fund 2013 telethon was 
the construction of this road.
ARMENIA — TURKEY
expectations of and responses to turkish foreign 
minister Ahmet davutoglu’s one-day visit to 
Yerevan in early december exemplified Armenia-
turkey relations today.  
the foreign minister arrived in Armenia to 
participate in the Black sea economic cooperation’s 
semi-annual ministerial meeting. four years earlier, 
in the heyday of the development of the protocols 
process that was intended to lead to diplomatic 
relations and an open border, davutoglu’s 
predecessor Ali Babacan came to Armenia, in April 
of 2009. Babacan met with president sargsyan. 
davutoglu did not. instead, he held a longish tense 
meeting with Armenian foreign minister edward 
nalbandian, at the conclusion of which they issued 
a one-line statement.
According to the Armenian foreign ministry’s 
statement, nalbandian reiterated Armenia’s 
insistence that Armenia-turkey relations be 
discussed without preconditions, referring to 
davutoglu’s linkage of Armenia-turkey progress 
to the Karabakh resolution process.
Both seemed focused on 2015, and the 100th 
anniversary of the beginning of the Armenian 
genocide. Armenia intends to maximize 
its advantageous position in anticipation of 
international attention, and is still intent on 
seeing the protocols concluded. Ankara wants to 
demonstrate to the international community that 
there is a bilateral process on the ground, and 
therefore third countries should not intervene or 
invoke 1915 and its consequences. 
Ankara, unlike Yerevan, does not discourage civil 
society or other kinds of joint activities. Yerevan, 
on the other hand, actively discourages those 
organizations on which it has influence.
Azerbaijan bought $1 billion 
in military equipment 
from Russia, including the 
offensive SMERCH multiple-
rocket launchers. During 
Putin’s visit to Baku, it was 
announced that Azerbaijan 
has bought $4 billion in 
armaments from Russia 
since 2010
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still, Ankara’s efforts are conditioned by Baku’s 
reactions. in April, after long negotiations, 
an Armenian-turkish venture was to initiate 
weekly flights between the eastern turkish (and 
historically Armenian) city of Van and Yerevan. the 
clear symbolism and the proximity of the two cities 
was the driving motivation. the beneficiary would 
clearly have been the turkish side, with Armenian 
citizens and tourists making the journey to the 
lake and the entire region. At the last moment, the 
turkish side succumbed to pressure from Baku and 
the flights were indefinitely delayed.
in november, the Armenian revolutionary 
federation - dashnaktsutyun Bureau, the 
organization’s highest body, sent a delegation 
to istanbul to participate in the socialist 
international council meeting. the Arf had 
not officially participated in anything in turkey 
since 1923. the dashnaktsutyun members met 
with members of the pro-Kurdish peace and 
democracy party. similar meetings between the 
two parties had been held in washington dc 
a month earlier. the statement issued by the 
dashnaktsutyun after the meeting said that the 
sides discussed “the likelihood of Armenian-
Kurdish cooperation, based on western Armenia 
and Kurdistan, and the national and democratic 
dreams of the Armenian and Kurdish peoples.”
there are other efforts to bridge the gap of 
understanding between Armenians and turks. 
in december, an Armenian and a turkish actor 
set the world record for the longest lasting 
handshake. the purpose they said was to 
demonstrate that despite the existing problems, 
contact is possible between the two peoples.
in november, the civilitas foundation became 
the first Armenian organization to establish a 
presence in turkey. civilitas intends to work 
with turkish and Armenian individuals and 
organizations to contribute to efforts to open the 
border, to highlight the Armenian community of 
istanbul, and to offer forums for activities that 
will help fill the information gap about Armenians 
in Armenia, in the diaspora, and in turkey, 
before and after the genocide.   
Armenia-turkey trade remains an interesting 
indicator of relations. Ankara places a 1000 
percent customs fee on Armenian imports. trade 
from January to october, 2013, was $165 million, 
which is a bit less than the same period in 2012, 
and comprises 3.5 percent of Armenia’s overall 
trade. Because of the closed border between the 
two countries, trade is conducted through georgia.
ARMENIA – IRAN
Both iran and Armenia held presidential elections 
in 2013. the vote that elected Hasan rouhani 
president was not questioned either within iran or 
abroad.
But two decades of Armenia-iran relations have 
demonstrated that regardless of who holds the 
presidency in either country, or the nature of 
the governments’ economic or foreign policies, 
Armenia-iran relations are not affected. the 
reason is that both Yerevan and tehran are aware 
of each other’s minimal requirements and the 
imperative need that they be met.
iran’s then-foreign minister attended serzh 
sargsyan’s inauguration ceremony. But sargsyan 
himself was present at rouhani’s oath-taking 
when they held their first meeting, although they 
had met earlier in 2001 in Yerevan, and in 2005 
in tehran, when both held other positions.
it is important for Armenia to be able to count 
on firm relations with iran. this is important 
to offset turkey’s influence in the region. it 
is also important because iran, like georgia, 
While Azerbaijan still has 
no ready capacity to defeat 
Armenian forces on the 
ground, it has certainly 
amassed substantial 
resources to cause significant 
Armenian casualties if it 
were to initiate hostilities 
in the form of a massive 
artillery strike
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offers Armenia an outlet to the world, given the 
closed borders to the east and west. iran can 
also become an alternative energy source, at 
least in theory, depending on what limitations 
result from Armenia-russia negotiations, and the 
consequences of iran’s negotiations on nuclear 
power, with the west.
At the end of the year, after Armenia’s gas 
deal with russia became public, the iranian 
ambassador in Yerevan announced that iran can 
provide Armenia with cheaper gas. Armenian 
officials responded saying it’s possible to negotiate 
such a deal if the iranian gas price does not 
exceed $189. the physical transport of the gas 
would be easy since the gas pipeline, constructed 
in 2007, serves to send gas to Armenia, which 
currently is completely transformed to electricity 
and sent back to iran.
regular mid and high level visits took place 
throughout 2013. in addition to the iranian 
foreign minister’s visit in April, for president 
sargsyan’s inauguration, iran’s chief prosecutor 
also visited Armenia and signed an agreement on 
cooperation against transnational crime.
political relations remain warm while progress on 
economic projects is sluggish.
energy ministers visited each other’s countries 
and were received by the presidents. cooperation 
in the energy sector remains a priority and the 
sides stressed again the importance of the third 
400w high voltage electricity transmission line 
which was to have been built in 2010. they also 
repeated the significance of the two 130mw 
hydro electric stations one on each side of the 
Armenian-iranian border. the symbolic start of 
construction on these took place in 2012, with the 
participation of Armenia’s president. But neither 
of the two projects has moved. the first project is 
to cost $146 million, and the second $323 million, 
with the iranian side financing both.
in the agriculture sector, a slaughterhouse was 
set up in Armenia’s southern syunik region in 
the summer of 2013, specifically to prepare and 
sell sheepskin and mutton. iran is foreseen as 
an important market for mutton and lamb, and 
experts from iran are employed to assure that 
the preparation processes are ritually correct. 
sheep from syunik, as well as from other 
Armenian regions, and Karabakh as well, will be 
brought to this location.
As for raising sufficient quantities of sheep for 
iranian export, several contradictory stories remained 
unresolved by year’s end. iranian media had reported 
that a written agreement reached between iran’s 
Azerbaijan region, and the syunik marz will make 
it possible for iran to lease tens of thousands of 
hectares of Armenian land for sheep grazing.
the document itself, initially kept from the 
Armenian public, was eventually published in 
Armenian media. it indicated that the agreement 
refers to at least 50,000 hectares for a period of 
10 years. in october, Armenia’s vice-minister of 
territorial administration said the issue is closed 
and no such lease arrangements will be made.
trade with iran remains low, despite consistent 
growth in both exports and imports over the last few 
years. in 2012, imports amounted to $219.4 million 
and exports $108.5 million. in the first 10 months of 
2013, trade decreased by 9.3 percent, to a total of 
$246 million. iranian-Armenian trade constitutes 5.2 
percent of Armenia’s total external trade.
ARMENIA – GEORGIA
it is probably Armenia-georgia relations more 
than any other that changed overnight and 
drastically in 2013. for the last decade and a 
in this no-peace no-war 
situation, the Azerbaijani 
leadership is likely to 
continue to resort to lower-
intensity and lower-risk 
activities, such as what has 
become regular sniper fire 
and less frequent aerial 
maneuvers and special 
operations
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half,  Armenia and georgia were headed towards 
the european union. despite all their differences 
— political, economic, geographic — they shared 
that european direction. on september 3, that 
changed. Armenia-georgia relations are entering a 
new unknown phase, conditioned by geopolitical 
shifts in the region.
on september 3, Armenia’s president expressed 
interest in joining the russian-led customs union 
(members: russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) and in 2015 
also join the yet-to-be-created eurasian union.
Armenia is a member of the commonwealth of 
independent states and the collective security 
treaty organization. georgia, with whom Armenia 
shares a 200 kilometer long border (125 miles) is 
not and has expressed its clear desire to join both 
nAto and the european union.
georgia and Armenia have seen serious differences 
in political direction and priorities, yet both have 
been particularly careful about not exacerbating 
them and maintaining normal relations between 
the two countries in order not to endanger the 
region’s fragile stability.
some 70 percent of Armenia’s trade goes through 
georgia. thus, Armenia’s membership in the 
customs union will naturally affect economic 
cooperation and trade relations adversely, if both 
countries don’t specifically focus on improving 
and deepening economic cooperation, especially 
given cool russia-georgia relations.   
improved georgian-russian relations is clearly 
in Armenia’s interest. with movement forward 
in that direction, then Armenia-georgia-russia 
cooperation would help keep Armenia from total 
regional isolation, which has become the intended 
and unintended consequence of the deepening 
turkey-georgia-Azerbaijan axis.
the Kars-tbilisi-Baku rail line will begin 
operating in 2014. Building began in earnest 
when the oil began to flow from Baku to ceyhan 
and Azerbaijan was able to offer georgia low-
interest financing to begin the process. it stopped 
for a short time as a result of the georgia-russia 
war. the new rail connection circumvents the 
existing line that for nearly a century connected 
Kars to Baku thru the Armenian city of gyumri. 
for that reason, the eu or the us did not 
offer funding in order not to contribute to the 
isolation process.  
in January, immediately after his visit to Baku, 
georgia’s new prime minister visited Yerevan. 
there,  he said Armenia could serve as an 
example to georgia in its foreign relations — 
referring to Armenia’s ability to maintain normal 
relations with russia and the west.
this statement, coupled with an earlier one 
he had made about the questionable cost-
effectiveness of the proposed Kars-tbilisi-Baku 
railway, raised concerns among the western-
leaning forces in georgia.
in April, several hundred Armenians from Javakhk 
demonstrated in front of the prime minister’s 
residence in tbilisi. this was the first time, since 
georgia’s independence, that the Armenians who 
form a majority in georgia’s southern samtskhe-
Javavakheti region, resorted to such means to 
call attention to their socio-economic problems. 
Among other issues, the demonstrators pointed 
out that all the local governance bodies were 
still led by those in president saakashvili’s 
camp. the government official who met with the 
demonstrators was the minister of re-integration, 
the same one whose portfolio includes the 
Abkhazia and s. ossetian conflicts.
in January, Vahagn chakhalyan, accused by the 
previous administration of being an ideologue for 
In June, at the G8 Summit in 
Ireland, the presidents of the 
three Minsk Group co-Chair 
countries issued a statement 
expressing “deep regret that, 
rather than trying to find a 
solution based upon mutual 
interests, the parties have 
continued to seek one-sided 
advantage in the negotiation 
process
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Armenian separatism in Javakhk, was released 
after serving several years in prison on charges 
which included unlawful possession of firearms. 
A georgian parliament decision to offer amnesty 
to prisoners also resulted in freeing two other 
georgian-Armenians, both Armenian community 
leaders, charged with spying for russia. the 
Armenian church diocese of georgia considered 
them political prisoners.
A series of high-level visits in 2013 included 
georgia’s defense and foreign ministers visiting 
Yerevan in march and April, respectively. the 
two foreign ministers also met in new York in 
september and in tbilisi in november. Armenia’s 
foreign minister was present at the inauguration 
of newly-elected president giorgi margvelashvili.
when Armenia’s defense minister visited tbilisi, 
he met not only with his counterpart but also 
with prime minister ivanishvili. the foreign 
relations committees of both parliaments met near 
the Armenian-georgian border, in Armenia’s Lori 
region.
Armenia is among georgia’s top 10 trade partners. 
But georgia makes up less than three percent of 
Armenia’s total trade. the total volume — $123.2 
million dollars is still 34.8 percent higher than 
trade in the same period in 2012. georgia holds 
seventh place for Armenian exports — in the first 
10 months of 2013, that constituted 5.7 percent. 
exports to georgia fell in 2009 and in 2012; they 
formed $71 million, which was still $11 million 
less than the 2008 figures.
ARMENIA – RUSSIA
the year marked the lowest point in russian-
Armenian relations since independence. never 
before has russia so blatantly pressured Armenia, 
the Armenian government so badly mismanaged 
its most important foreign relationship and the 
Armenian public been so openly angered by 
russia.
in early september, Armenia’s president serzh 
sargsyan shocked most Armenians when on a visit 
to russia he declared his government’s intention 
to join the russia-led customs union and become 
one of the founding members of a new eurasian 
union. the declaration ran contrary to previous 
rhetoric by Armenian officials who for years 
discounted – if not dismissed – the possibility 
of such membership. the immediate cost of the 
declaration was a halt to plans for an association 
and trade agreement with the european union. 
incredibly, Armenian officials denied the policy 
turnaround was a result of pressure.
A drumbeat of russian warnings began months 
before sargsyan’s september declaration. A 
number of former russian officials and other 
public figures close to Armenia – including a 
former ambassador – publicly criticized Armenia’s 
intention to sign the Association Agreement with 
the european union and reluctance to integrate 
with russia. in April, Azerbaijani president ilham 
Aliyev revealed that he had secured more than 
$4 billion worth of contracts for arms supplies 
from russia. Armenia’s president appeared to try 
to postpone taking difficult decisions, skipping 
two russia-led summits in may, no doubt 
further irritating russia’s Vladimir putin. in June 
Azerbaijan’s military parade displayed new tanks 
and artillery systems that russia had delivered 
just weeks earlier. more talk of arms deals was 
heard when putin visited Azerbaijan, ahead of 
Armenia, in August.
when putin finally came to Armenia in december 
(the trip had been postponed since 2012), the 
cost-benefit calculations involved in Armenia’s 
september decision became even clearer. putin 
declared that henceforth and in anticipation of 
Armenia promptly joining the customs union – 
perhaps as early as february 2014 – russia would 
As part of its effort to 
minimize international 
interaction with the 
Armenian side, Azerbaijan 
has both expanded and 
publicized its ‘black list’ 
of officials, journalists, 
artists and others who visit 
Karabakh
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drop tariffs on natural gas, hydrocarbons and 
rough diamonds sold to Armenia. He also hinted 
that in the absence of that decision, Armenia 
could be paying as much as russia’s european 
customers – up to $400 per thousand cubic 
meters of natural gas. 
Armenia’s energy minister also revealed that 
contrary to past government claims, russia had 
effectively raised the price for natural gas to 
Armenia at the end of 2011 to $270 for a thousand 
cubic meters, resulting in a fresh $300 million debt 
over two years. As part of the debt repayment, 
Armenia transferred to russia its remaining 20 
percent share in Armenia’s natural gas utility, 
making it a fully-owned subsidiary of the russian 
state-owned gazprom. putin’s visit also marked 
the formal launch of the fifth bloc of the Hrazdan 
thermal power plant after some $300 million in 
gazprom investments.  russia remained Armenia’s 
single largest foreign trade partner, with trade 
reaching $1.1 billion in the first eight months of 
year, with expectations of matching or surpassing 
the $1.3 billion in trade turnover reached in 2012.
sargsyan took four trips to russia, three of 
them in september. in June, Armenia’s media, 
including the government-connected outlets, 
had helped fuel public anger over mistreatment 
of an Armenian citizen charged in a road 
accident near moscow that left 18 bus passengers, 
including children, dead. Just two weeks after 
the customs union declaration, the Armenian 
president attended the consecration of the huge 
new Armenian cathedral in moscow, a ceremony 
also notable by the absence of any senior russian 
officials. putin’s visit to Armenia in turn was 
marked by the first-ever public protest of a visit 
by the russian president.
in contrast to frequent visits by european 
legislators, just a single duma member, 
representing a non-ruling Just russia party, 
visited Karabakh during the year.
ARMENIA – EU
in July, the european union concluded the 
seventh and final round of trade talks with 
Armenia and deep and comprehensive free 
trade area, as part of the association agreement, 
negotiated for more than three and a half years 
and expected to be signed in november at the eu 
eastern partnership summit in Vilnius. president 
sargsyan’s declaration on Armenia’s plans to join 
the customs union nixed those plans. russia’s 
pressure also forced ukraine to postpone signing 
its association agreement with the eu, with 
moldova and georgia the only two of the original 
four candidates going ahead. Armenia’s and 
ukraine’s decisions caught eu officials offguard.
the european union countries continued to 
account for the largest share of Armenia’s 
foreign trade turnover, amounting to $1.1 billion 
in the first eight months of the year, virtually 
unchanged from 2012. raw materials – mostly 
copper and molybdenum exported to germany – 
accounted for 80 percent of Armenia’s exports to 
eu countries. the potential impact of Armenia’s 
membership in the customs union on Armenia-eu 
trade remained unknown. 
throughout the year, talks continued on the 
potential entry of carrefour retail chain into 
Armenia and the public and private resistance of 
Armenia’s own supermarket chain owners, all of 
them in parliament or government. in november, 
the french ambassador to Armenia indicated 
that Armenia was open to carrefour, but it 
remained unclear when the first supermarkets 
might actually open. meantime, British orogen 
gold (geoteam) secured mining concessions in 
Armenia’s Vayots dzor province and the company 
reported fresh gold discoveries in August.
the year began on a positive note in Armenia-eu 
relations, as the Armenian government received 
a generally positive assessment of the conduct 
of presidential elections in february that saw 
president sargsyan re-elected to a second term. 
sargsyan’s bid was effectively endorsed by the 
european people’s party (epp) – the largest right-
of-center grouping of political parties in europe, 
with which Armenia’s ruling republican party is 
affiliated.
Armenia intends to 
maximize its advantageous 
position in anticipation of 
international attention
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in march, sargsyan attended an epp conference 
in Belgium and another epp event in Austria 
in June. Also in June, sargsyan went to poland 
and the following month attended an eastern 
partnership summit in moldova. the Armenian 
president also paid a visit to france, including 
the council of europe, in october, and attended 
the Vilnius summit in november, where instead 
of the negotiated association agreement, Armenia 
and eu issued a broad statement on continued 
cooperation.
A number of senior european officials visited 
Armenia throughout the year, including a 
number of parliamentarians from the uK, 
france, germany, denmark, czech, greece and 
the european parliament.  some also visited 
Karabakh.
ARMENIA – US
the united states did not send a single senior 
official to Armenia during 2013. Armenia’s foreign 
and finance ministers paid regular, low-key visits 
to washington. Late in the year, president and 
parliament speaker of nagorno Karabakh were 
in us to attend the annual fundraising telethon 
and a congressional briefing, held in Los Angeles 
and washington, respectively. A delegation of 
california state and city officials went to Yerevan 
and stepanakert in september.
in november, fresh off a diplomatic breakthrough 
with iran, secretary of state John Kerry appeared 
to revive us interest in the Karabakh peace process 
while helping secure the first Armenian-Azerbaijani 
presidential summit in almost two years. it was 
unclear if Kerry’s involvement would continue.
us-Armenia trade amounted to $197 million 
in the first ten months of 2013, a 2.6 percent 
increase over the same period in 2012. 
in April, the 2014 us Budget was released, with 
a 38% cut in economic aid to Armenia. if the 
proposal is approved by congress, aid to Armenia 
will be reduced to its lowest level since the 1988 
earthquake. the Administration proposed $25 
million in economic support funds for Armenia 
which was dramatically less than last year’s actual 
economic aid allocation of $40 million. in the 
end, for the first time in more than 20 years, 
there was no  specific aid allocation for Armenia, 
as well as most countries. Aid for Karabakh will 
probably be kept at the same levels of previous 
years — about $2 million — but the allocation 
for Armenia will probably see a drastic cut in 
accordance with the budget compromise with the 
republicans.  
the Armenian government approved in principle 
plans to privatize the Vorotan hydro-energy 
cascade. contourglobal purchased the cascade 
for $180 million, making it the biggest private 
American investment in Armenia to date.  
on september 28th, the government of Armenia 
and the united states Agency for international 
development (usAid) signed an Assistance 
agreement called “more participatory, accountable 
and effective government.” 
OUTLOOK
the reset of us-russia relations did not 
produce tangible results, on the contrary, their 
disagreements and contradictions deepened. the 
same can be said for russia-european union 
relations, taking into consideration, among 
other contentions, the events at year-end when 
Armenia declined to initial and ukraine to sign 
the Association Agreement with the european 
union. Because of a lack of clear vision and 
At the end of the year, 
after Armenia’s gas deal 
with Russia became public, 
the Iranian ambassador in 
Yerevan announced that 
Iran can provide Armenia 
with cheaper gas. Armenian 
officials responded saying it’s 
possible to negotiate such a 
deal if the Iranian gas price 
does not exceed $189
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foreign policy anchor, Armenia will continue 
to fall victim to the consequences of those 
contradictions and will be deprived of potential 
benefits that positive engagement with both sides 
would provide.
At the end of 2013, the dividing lines in the 
caucasus were further delineated. if european 
integration had been the only remaining 
common consideration for Armenia, georgia and 
Azerbaijan, that too vanished. georgia remained 
faithful to its european orientation, Armenia 
retreated from it and Azerbaijan maintained 
neutrality. this will have a negative impact on 
developments in the region in 2014 and beyond.
Although turkey will be preoccupied with its 
domestic troubles and upcoming elections, it will 
continue to feign readiness for concessions and 
closer relations with Armenia. on the threshold of 
the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, 
it will be extremely important for Ankara to 
create the illusion of establishing relations and 
thereby discouraging the international community 
from making statements. Armenia, taking into 
consideration the diaspora factor and its recent 
miscalculations on relations with turkey, will try 
not to be pulled into Armenian-turkish processes.
Armenia’s parliament remains ready to ratify the 
protocols if turkey’s parliament ratifies them first, 
and if clear guarantees for its post-ratification 
implementation are given. 
opening of the Armenian-turkish border in 2014 
is unlikely because of the improbability of any 
potential progress on the nagorno Karabakh issue. 
despite optimistic expectations of the osce 
minsk group regarding the process of the 
Karabakh conflict, any positive development for 
its settlement is highly unlikely. the two sides 
have never been farther apart in their positions. 
in 2014, Azerbaijan will continue efforts to 
neutralize and retreat from the madrid document 
or any other alternative where the clear right 
of self-determination for nagorno Karabakh is 
codified.
in december 2013, Azerbaijan signed an 
agreement with British petroleum to build a 
pipeline where Azerbaijan will supply caspian 
natural gas to europe through turkey. in the 
coming years, it is expected that the european 
union will receive two percent of its natural gas 
demand from that pipeline. in 2014, this project 
will continue to be a strategic undertaking. 
the european union is unlikely to propose a new 
format for cooperation with Armenia. the eu will 
expect that Armenia specify what it is prepared 
to do.  However, any future interaction between 
Armenia and the eu will be marred by suspicion 
and distrust. 
A thaw in iran-us and iran-west relations may 
occur if iran’s president and the country’s 
spiritual rulers on the one hand and the leaders 
of the west on the other hand are mindful of the 
expectations and interests of the other side.
Although georgia’s democratically elected 
government and president, contrary to the 
previous administration, have adopted a more 
realistic and less belligerent policy in relations 
with russia, still, conditions are not in place to 
overcome the tbilisi-moscow crisis. georgia is 
determined to continue its european integration 
policy, which russia views as the european 
union’s and nAto’s expansion into its sphere 
of influence. russia will not retreat from its 
recognition of Abkhazia and south ossetia, 
therefore serious progress in georgian-Abkhaz 
and georgian-south ossetian negotiations will not 
take place.
POLICY OPTIONS
Armenia must clarify its policy with regard 
to the european union and soon. taking into 
consideration that membership in the customs 
union will proceed quickly, Armenia, from the 
outset, must demonstrate initiative and restart 
negotiations with the european union and try 
to restore trust. Additionally, using the reform 
package within the Association Agreement as a 
foundation, it must present its own proposals to 
the european union.
conscious of the fact that european integration, 
the only common platform for Armenia and 
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georgia, no longer exists, in 2014 Armenia must 
demonstrate greater effort and initiative to clarify 
its relations with georgia including programs to 
realize economic integration.
the recent visit to Armenia of turkey’s foreign 
minister, the statements and the leaks that 
followed it, suggest that turkey has began to 
pre-empt and prevent all possible undesirable 
developments on the threshold of the 100th 
anniversary of the Armenian genocide. Armenia 
must develop clear approaches and steer events, 
rather than consistently react. in connection 
with the 100th anniversary, Armenia must define 
programs and initiatives.
Yerevan must exhibit initiative in order to 
remedy the crisis in Armenia-turkey relations 
and to restore those relations to at least the 2008 
football diplomacy level. it will be an unfavorable 
situation for Armenia if Yerevan continues its 
position of former years, namely that Yerevan has 
signed the two protocols, it has done what was 
expected of it and the ball is now in turkey’s 
court. the current situation where the protocols 
have neither been ratified, and Armenia has 
not retreated from them, exclusively serves the 
interests of turkey.
with regard to nagorno Karabakh, Armenia must 
prevent Azerbaijani attempts to retreat from the 
madrid document and start negotiations anew. 
Azerbaijan’s motivation stems from its desire 
to remove from the international community’s 
mindset the already entrenched principle of the 
right to self-determination for the people of 
nagorno Karabakh.
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there were four dates which, 
taken together, represented 
Armenia’s significant political 
and social developments in 2013: 
february 19, July 19, september 
3, september 4. on the first two 
of those dates, vocal segments 
of the Armenian public took 
to the streets — for different 
reasons, but with the same 
message: that their voices be 
counted.  on the two successive 
days in september, the president 
adopted one policy and hinted 
at another, both of which will 
change the course of Armenia’s 
future.  
this was a year for elections. Both the president as 
well as the mayor of Yerevan were re-elected to 
their posts in 2013.
february 19, the day after the presidential election, 
one of the candidates challenging serzh sargsyan, 
raffi Hovannisian, claimed that he had received 
not just 35 percent of the vote, as the central 
electoral  commission announced, but a majority, 
and was indeed the president-elect. from february 
19 to mid to late April, more Armenians exhibited 
more ownership of the electoral system, than at 
any time in the recent past. insisting their voices 
had not been heard or counted, rallies took place 
throughout Armenia.
the presidential election took place on february 18 
and was in many ways, simply the last chapter of 
the parliamentary elections held the year before. 
president serzh sargsyan who had campaigned 
alone, as he had when he headed the ticket for the 
republican party during the parliamentary election, 
was announced the winner within hours of the 
polls closing.
the day itself was quiet, largely without overt 
tension or violence. gone were the days of lights 
going out, ballot boxes being switched, or proxies 
being beaten.
seven candidates were on the ballot: Along 
with the president, there was former foreign 
minister Hovannisian of the Heritage party, 
former prime minister Hrant Bagratyan, 
soviet dissident paruyr Hairikian, and three 
public figures — Andreas ghukasyan, Vardan 
sedrakyan and Arman melikyan. the other 
three parties in parliament — the prosperous 
Armenia party, the Armenian revolutionary 
federation dashnaktsutyun, the Armenian 
national movement — did not run candidates. 
nor did they support the president’s candidacy. 
thus, raffi Hovannisian benefited from the 
protest vote.
the absence of other serious opposition was 
a manifestation of the message delivered by 
the republican party beginning soon after the 
parliamentary election, that the game is over, the 
winner is clearly the incumbent president. the 
public appeared to agree, believing that would be 
the outcome, regardless of the actual votes cast. 
the republican party’s unilateral hold over the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches, as 
well as most regional and local governance bodies 
gave credence to this assumption. the republican 
party had access to serious administrative 
resources..
perhaps this fait-accompli environment was the 
cause for the refusal of the three parliamentary 
factions to participate with their own candidates. 
the prosperous Armenia party which had 
garnered more than 30 percent of the vote during 
the parliamentary election just eight months 
earlier, had all along indicated its intention to 
participate in the presidential poll. At the last 
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moment, in early december, they made an 
announcement to the contrary.
the Armenian national congress leader, former 
president Levon ter petrossian used his age — 68 
years old — to explain the lack of a candidate.
the Arf dashnaktsutyun presented a series of 
unrelated reasons from claims that the outcome is 
clear, to the inability of the parties to agree on a 
joint candidate.
president sargsyan’s campaign slogan was 
“towards a secure Armenia.” Hovannisian used 
“it’s possible.”
the campaign was marred by a shooting incident 
which was described as an assassination attempt 
against one of the candidates. Hairikian was 
shot at by several men who were later linked to 
candidate sedrakyan. All were found guilty and 
incarcerated. sargsyan received Hairikian while 
in hospital, and later, after the election, allocated 
20 million Amd for Hairikian to receive treatment 
abroad.
meanwhile, ghukasyan, whose campaign slogan was 
“An end to Artificial elections” conducted a hunger 
strike, on the steps of the national Academy building 
during the whole of the four-week campaign 
period.  ghukasyan called on all the candidates to 
pull out of the race in order not give credence to 
the “preplanned and preordained campaign” of the 
ruling powers. this did not happen.
there were no other extraordinary incidents. 
nor were there any opportunities to hear the 
candidates in a debate setting. the president did 
not agree to participate in any of the debates 
proposed by various broadcast and online 
channels.
sargsyan’s campaign consisted largely a series of 
prepared remarks, almost exclusively away from 
Yerevan. the three times during the campaign 
when he spoke extemporaneously, his remarks, 
on-camera, were extensively distributed online.  
from “next you’ll accuse me for making your 
cucumbers grow crooked,” in response to a man 
complaining that his children must migrate to 
find work,  to “what percentage of votes do you 
want me to get? what do you want me to hit? 
90? 80? 70? whatever you want, that’s what we’ll 
get,”  to a reporter who asked what the president 
considers the winning percentage of votes — the 
answers were the subject of derision.
the voter lists remained a serious concern. the 
four parties had attempted, in the parliamentary 
election period, to receive access to the lists 
of those who actually voted, as a check against 
possible fraud, but this had not worked. Yet, there 
were 2,529,000 names on the voter lists for the 
february 2013 presidential election, 43,000 more 
than in the unexplainably smaller 2,486,000 that 
comprised the may 2012 lists. the opposition 
insisted these ‘extra’ names are used to falsify 
votes in favor of the incumbent. on election day, 
observers noted sets of similar-looking signatures 
back-to-back.
other misuses of administrative resources, noted 
also by the osce odiHr, included  the mandatory 
participation of civil sector workers, including 
teachers and their students, in weekday campaign 
events.  the observers also noted crude violations 
of electoral law: various incidents pointing to vote 
fraud, including ballot marking and submission, 
disappearing ink intended to prevent repeat-
voting, and vote buying — at a rate of 5,000 Amd 
as cited by the international observers.
Just a few hours after the polls closed, raffi 
Hovannisian charged massive voter fraud. 
Hovannisian had received a surprising 37 percent 
of the vote, significantly higher than the 22 
percent recorded for presidential candidate (and 
former president) Levon ter-petrossian in 2008. 
The absence of other 
serious opposition was a 
manifestation of the message 
delivered by the Republican 
Party beginning soon after 
the parliamentary election, 
that the game is over, 
the winner is clearly the 
incumbent president.
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unlike ter-petrossian, whose speeches consisted 
of serious charges leveled at the candidate, and at 
the former administration, Hovannisian’s door-
to-door, village-to-village countrywide campaign 
and its warm, inclusive message, was novel for 
Armenia. His signature handshake and greeting 
“Barev” gave the campaign the name “the Barev 
campaign.”
the name changed to “Barevolution” a few days 
later. Beginning on february 19, Hovannisian 
and his supporters held mass rallies in Yerevan 
and other cities. At the freedom square rally 
of february 20, several political figures joined 
the protestors. on february 21, Hovannisian 
and thousands of his supporters headed to 
the president’s offices. Hovannisian entered 
the building, met with the president, and 
proposed three possible outcomes to the public 
dissatisfaction: the president’s resignation, new 
presidential elections or new parliamentary 
elections. president sargsyan rejected all three 
possibilities.
the next day there were more than 10,000 
protestors at the square. the Arf dashnaktsutyun 
announced it was joining the protests. Armen 
rustamyan, a member of the Arf’s parliamentary 
faction, and head of the Arf in Armenia, said 
that on february 18, election day,  the Armenian 
citizen rebelled against “injustice, hopelessness 
and emigration.”  the Armenian national congress 
went further. ter-petrossian openly declared 
that Hovannisian had won the election. still, the 
struggle remained Hovannisian’s and Heritage’s 
alone. the backlash to the election was not a 
united one.
on february 25, the official returns were 
announced. According to the central electoral 
commission, there was 60 percent voter 
participation, with the following vote count:
serzh sargsyan (58.64 percent of the vote) — 
861,373 votes
raffi Hovannisian (36.74 percent) — 539,693
Hrant Bagratyan (2.15 percent) — 31,643
paruyr Hairikyan (1.23 percent) — 18,096
Andreas ghukasyan (0.57 percent) — 8,329
Vardan sedrakyan (0.42 percent) — 6,210
Arman melikyan (0.24 percent) — 3,520
Hovannisian and ghukasyan appealed to the 
constitutional court, independently. Both asked 
that the election results be declared null and 
void. the court did not satisfy the appeals.
the official vote count showed that Hovannisian 
won 55 to sargsyan’s 45 in all electoral districts 
where voter participation did not exceed 60 
percent. where voter participation numbers were 
higher, sargsyan won 68 to 32.
According to transparency international, 
excessive voting was not registered in precincts 
where there was consistent and serious 
monitoring by observers. transparency also 
noted that 64 percent of voters (in 886 out of 
1988 precincts) must have voted in less than 
60 seconds – something considered highly 
improbable, but serving as a likely indicator of 
violations not statistical aberrations.  
there was concentrated effort to include domestic 
observers to the hundreds of international 
observers invited every year. over 200 
diasporans, too, were recruited and trained to 
follow the voting process and vote count.
other findings also raise questions. in some rural 
communities, voter turnout was 90 to 95 percent, 
and sargsyan received nearly 100 percent of the votes. 
in a few of these villages, the village population is 
smaller than the number of votes recorded.
the osce odiHr final report remarked upon 
these statistical anomalies and noted that they 
There were no other 
extraordinary incidents. Nor 
were there any opportunities 
to hear the candidates 
in a debate setting. The 
President did not agree 
to participate in any of 
the debates proposed by 
various broadcast and online 
channels.
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raise questions about the fairness of the electoral 
processes and point to the possibility of serious 
violations. 
sargsyan won in all regions, except the northern 
region of shirak. in gyumri, the center of shirak, 
and Armenia’s second city, sargsyan received only 
27 percent of the vote. perhaps coincidentally, 
perhaps not, neither sargsyan nor any other 
high level government officials have visited the 
city since, not even on the occasion of the 25th 
anniversary of the earthquake which shook 
gyumri in 1988.
the international community recognized the 
outcome of the elections. the european union 
leadership welcomed the progress made.
Hovannisian reacted negatively to these 
statements, as he did to the speedy 
congratulations offered the president by the 
catholicos of All Armenians. Hovannisian blasted 
the head of the Armenian church, and in turn 
was at the receiving end of the patriarch’s calls 
to put a stop to the hunger strike and adopt more 
constructive methods of protest.
Hovannisian had resorted to a hunger strike after 
a period of visiting towns and villages throughout 
Armenia. in places where he had received a 
majority of the votes, the turnout was warm and 
welcoming. in other towns, where administrative 
resources were used, violent provocations were 
not unusual. when this happened in the town 
of sevan, and in the presence of the mayor who 
threatened his group and suggested they leave 
and go have it out with sargsyan, Hovannisian put 
an end to the public meetings and the three-week 
hunger strike began, with the purpose of urging 
president sargsyan to step down before the April 
9 inauguration date.
daily forums, public exchanges, lectures, 
performances, concerts filled up the days at 
freedom square and kept the protestors’ hopes 
alive. Hovannisian and sargsyan exchanged some 
letters, but no political change was forthcoming. 
Hovannisian was proposing new presidential 
elections, or “sharing the rule with the 
people.”  By this, Hovannisian suggested special 
parliamentary elections by year’s end, replacing 
the governors of half of Armenia’s 10 regions with 
Hovannisian’s candidates, and also fill the positions 
of prosecutor general, state revenue chief, 
national security service to Hovannisian followers. 
sargsyan’s counter-offer was that Hovannisian 
head the soon-to-be-created constitutional 
reform commission. this was turned down. on 
April 1, Hovannisian resumed what appeared to be 
a repeat pilgrimage throughout Armenia, calling 
on the public to join him in freedom square on 
April 9 at his inauguration ceremony.
thus, on April 9, two inauguration ceremonies 
took place — one official, highly constructed 
and scripted, down to pre-filmed shots of the 
motorcade, and another for the public, unscripted, 
unpredictable, unclear.
the official inauguration ceremony, which had every 
election since independence, taken place in the 
opera, was moved to the hard-to-access demirjian 
concert complex near tsitsernakaberd. none of the 
representatives of the four parliamentary factions 
attended. Armenia’s second president, robert 
Kocharian, was present, as was the president of 
Karabakh.  first president Levon ter-petrossian had 
not received an invitation. neither had Hovannisian.
simultaneously, in freedom square, Hovannisian 
took an oath to a “new Armenia.” He and his 
thousands of supporters marched to a nearby 
square, and placed flowers in memory of the 10 
people who were killed during the march 1 events, 
in the violence that  followed the 2008 presidential 
election. then they moved towards the presidential 
offices, only to be met by police barring their way. 
After a return to freedom square, they headed to 
The voter lists remained a 
serious concern. The four 
parties had attempted, in 
the parliamentary election 
period, to receive access 
to the lists of those who 
actually voted, as a check 
against possible fraud
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the presidential offices again, and again the police 
obstructed their path. there were altercations, and 
among those hurt was a member of the Heritage 
party leadership. the evening ended in uncertainty. 
Hovannisian went to tsitsernakaberd to pray, in the 
company of the police chief. the protestors stayed 
behind, wondering what had happened.
the protests held in the following days saw less and 
less participation. Hovannisian later admitted that 
April 9 was not organized well, but he also declared 
that he was not prepared to issue “100 notes of 
condolences nor to participate in funerals.”
weeks later, sargsyan re-appointed tigran 
sargsyan as prime minister, in effect endorsing the 
economic and other policies of the government 
during the previous five years.
Less than a month after the inauguration, Yerevan 
held elections to select a municipal council, which 
would in turn choose a mayor. while many expected 
that the may 5 elections might serve as a proxy, or 
a continuation, or a settling of scores, or even as a 
compensation for the shortcomings, faults or sins of 
the previous two elections, it did not happen.
the losing parties, potentially in a position to 
aim for a majority by benefitting from public 
frustration, did not do so intensively, seriously or 
consistently. the winning republican party, on the 
other hand,  in a position to try to demonstrate 
some semblance of power-sharing or inclusion, was 
unwilling to give more importance to the process 
itself than a victorious outcome. the result then 
was an unsatisfactory election, with the republican 
party winning a 56 percent majority, and the 
the incumbent republican party member taron 
margaryan, being elected mayor. nearly 54 percent 
of eligible voters cast their ballots. Aside from the 
republican party, the prosperous Armenia party, 
too, passed the minimal threshold, as did the Barev 
Yerevan Alliance (based on raffi Hovannisian’s 
presidential campaign)  entered the 65-seat 
municipal council.
CORRUPTION
within days of the parliament confirming the 
new government, an article appeared in Hetq, 
the publication of the investigative Journalists 
Association. they had cooperated with the 
international consortium of investigative 
Journalists in their offshore Leaks investigation 
and published a report about offshore accounts in 
cyprus, held jointly by Armenia’s prime minister, 
the head of the Armenian church Yerevan 
diocese, and a businessman friend. while the 
worldwide expose resulted in a  21 percent decline 
in the incorporation of new offshore companies 
and many resignations in governments around 
the world, in Armenian expose had no serious 
consequences. it remained the subject of sarcasm 
and satire and social media banter.
According to the report, the three hold shares 
in a company called wilspera Holdings Limited, 
and according to the prime minister, the 
accounts were created without his knowledge. 
nevertheless, large amounts of cash from bank 
loans were purportedly funneled to a wilspera 
Holdings account. while the prime minister and 
the archbishop denied knowledge of such holdings 
and transactions, the Attorney general of cyprus, 
when in Armenia attending a meeting of chief 
prosecutors, categorically stated it is not possible 
to register a company in the name of an individual 
without that individual’s knowledge.
the questions abound largely because of the 
history of the funds in the account, which arose 
from the bankruptcy of one company, the loans 
it had received from an Armenian bank, the 
Armenian government’s positive assessment of 
the company and its business plan, and other 
administrative linkages.
the personal relationship among the three 
account holders gave credence to the story. in 
addition, the lifestyle of the archbishop involved, 
the unwillingness of the three to directly 
The official vote count 
showed that Hovannisian 
won 55 to Sargsyan’s 45 in 
all electoral districts where 
voter participation did not 
exceed 60 percent
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respond to questions, all contributed to a public 
readiness to believe the story.
After all, companies registered offshore play 
a huge role in Armenia’s economy, especially 
those in the mining, banking and construction 
sectors. in 2013 alone, investments from cyprus, 
recognized as a center of offshore finance, 
to Armenia grew 11 times. At year’s end, the 
washington-based global financial integrity 
issued a report about illicit financial outflows 
of capital from developing countries from 2002 
to 2011. According to the report, $6.2 billion 
disappeared from Armenia, $17 billion from 
Azerbaijan, and $4.5 billion from georgia.
POST ELECTION POLITICAL 
ENvIRONMENT
the 13-month election season which began in 
April 2012 and ended in may 2013 left not only 
the public even more deeply disenchanted, 
but the political parties and civil society were 
affected as well.
if the “opposition” mantle belonged to Levon 
ter-petrossian’s Armenian national congress from 
2008 to 2013, post-2013 it no longer did so. A 
series of defections from the Armenian national 
congress, lack of clarity about the intentions 
of the prosperous Armenia party, frustration 
with the Heritage party and raffi Hovannisian’s 
inability to hold on to the momentum created 
around him, and the Arf dashnaktsutyun’s mixed 
messages have resulted in an open field filled 
largely by a mix of civic activists who congregate 
around issues, and would-be politicians who still 
lack platforms but insist on regime change.
Among those who have appeared as possible new 
torchbearers are nikol pashinyan, previously a 
ter-petrossian ally, who pleases crowds with 
his sharp attacks on the government. He and 
a few other names who have become standard 
oppositionists are heading the only new 
organization to have been born of the post-
election dissatisfactions. called civic contract, 
it calls regular public meetings, which are a 
mix of public forum and collegial concerts. 
this organization has not been able to attract 
the masses. it is however the only institutional 
attempt at a collective citizens response.
there have been other, highly personal, 
responses. Among them was the reappearance, 
in november, of a soviet-era dissident, shant 
Harutyunyan, who outright challenged the sitting 
president’s legitimacy and said he would use all 
means to attract attention to what he called an 
emergency situation. several thousand joined him 
in his protests, until he was promptly arrested 
after wielding items which could cause harm.
CIvILC ACTIvISM
in 2013, civic activism continued to replace 
political party participation. the bulk of public 
participation revolved around issues which 
galvanized civic activists, who in turn galvanized 
large numbers of the public. citizen participation 
in political processes was channeled through 
these periodic outbursts which, more and more, 
are reactions to policy decisions, rather than mere 
outbursts of anger.
Yerevan’s new parking regulations, and the 
identity of the private entity which will be 
administering the system and receiving the 
fines, was the object of some demonstrations.  
throughout the year, there were sporadic protests 
against construction perceived to be illegal. 
none were sustainable nor did they succeed in 
impacting or overturning policy.
July 19 then became the day Armenia’s public 
transport system was ‘privatized’ by groups 
of self-organized young people who replaced 
The OSCE ODIHR final 
report remarked upon 
these statistical anomalies 
and noted that they raise 
questions about the fairness 
of the electoral processes 
and point to the possibility 
of serious violations
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the hundreds of mini-buses which connect 
the city. they took over the system in protest 
of the mayor’s unilateral decision to raise 
fare hikes. drivers and activists cooperated to 
offer rides and boycott the public transport 
vehicles. Although the protestors focused for 
a long time on demanding the resignation of 
those who had made the hike announcement, 
the actions extended beyond a protest against 
something, and turned into a movement in 
favor of something. Beyond issues of cost, 
public discussion broadened to include drivers’ 
rights, riders’ rights, conditions of buses, quality 
of service, and regulatory processes. they 
sustained the organized effort and the coalition-
building until the decision was rescinded 7 days 
later, with a promise to re-visit the issue in 
2014.
february 19 and July 19 represented the public’s 
frustration at not having a voice in processes that 
are, by right, the public’s.
on september 3 and 4, the president made 
two announcements which will also impact the 
public’s right to participate in the country’s 
future.
on september 3, Armenia’s president unilaterally 
announced that Armenia would join the russia-
led customs union and not initial the european 
union Association Agreement as the public had 
been led to believe for nearly four years, and 
longer.
on september 4, Armenia’s president named a 
commission charged with proposing changes to 
Armenia’s constitution. the proposals, expected 
by spring of 2014, may change Armenia’s 
governing structure and will provide indication 
of what the president expects will be his role in 
Armenia’s government following the end of his 
term in 2018.
responses to the second announcement were 
limited, since the nature of the proposed 
changes is unclear. the announcement did say 
the aim of the constitutional reforms would be 
to enforce the principle of the rule of law, to 
improve constitutional mechanisms to ensure 
basic human rights and freedom, and to provide 
a full balance of power and increased efficiency 
of public administration. But all this was not 
in context, and unexpected.  thus, it was met 
with skepticism and distrust, with commentators 
searching for motives and agendas since there 
had been no public discussions about the need to 
overhaul specific provisions of the constitution 
because of a demonstrated problem.  
the nature and depth of responses to the first 
announcement were complex. some responded 
to the content of the announcement — closer 
relations with russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, 
at the expense of closer relations with the eu.  
others responded to the manner in which the 
announcement was made — in russia, not in 
Armenia; in stark contrast to comments made 
in the past by every high office holder; with 
extreme acquiescence; unilaterally. most telling 
was what the process said about balance of 
powers. Literally within days of dismissing the 
customs union, several high-level officials did 
a complete about-face and expounded on the 
decision, with no debate.
As unilateral governance became the norm, 
public space shrank as well. According to 
freedom House, the countries of the former 
soviet union (minus the Baltic states) are the 
only region in the world where political rights 
and civil liberties have been in decline since 
2001. Armenia is no exception.
the us state department released its 2012 
Human rights report stating that Armenia’s 
most significant human rights violations were 
limitations of the citizens to change the 
government and fight against corruption, a 
The official inauguration 
ceremony, which had every 
election since independence, 
taken place in the Opera, 
was moved to the hard-
to-access Demirjian 
Concert Complex near 
Tsitsernakaberd
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lack of government transparency and limited 
independence of the judiciary. the report states 
that authorities used government resources during 
the parliamentary elections to support the ruling 
party and reports on credible allegations of vote 
buying. the report also states that the rule of law 
was undermined by the allegations of persistent 
corruption at all levels of government.
in the transparency international corruption 
perception index, Armenia ranks better than 
Azerbaijan, but worse than georgia. in Armenia, 
82 percent of respondents say that corruption is a 
problem or a serious problem in the public sector, 
nearly 70 percent believe that the judiciary, public 
officials and civil servants are corrupt.
in this environment, the Human rights defender 
attempted to make headway in 2013.
of all the ombudsman’s statements of the year, 
the report which received the most attention 
was a year-end special report on the judiciary, 
specifying problems with judicial proceedings, 
verdicts, double standards and especially a ‘bribe 
pricelist’.  
the increase in the amount and intensity of 
public protests led to an increase in the degree 
and intensity of police response. the duration 
of the protests against the bus fare hike offered 
more opportunity for violent altercations. in late 
August, the Human rights defender issued several 
calls following several high-profile beatings of 
journalists and activists, asking the police to 
assess the adequacy and legitimacy of police 
action.
Armenia ngos acknowledged his public backing 
of environmentalists’ right to protect the rights of 
certain groups . He also condemned the physical 
assault of journalists. He had done so earlier in 
the year, as well. He had also taken on the police 
during the rate-hike protests, supporting the 
activists’ right to pitch a tent (in the hot August 
heat). the police ignored both the activists and 
the ombudsman and disallowed the tent.
POLICE
it was a year of contradictions for Armenia’s police 
force. on the one hand, police response to civic 
activism included a greater degree of use of force. 
on the other hand, various aspects of the police 
system, as institution, were reformed and saw 
marked improvement.
the difference in use of force was stark. in 2012, 
there seemed to be a determined effort to respond 
with restraint. in 2013, there were multiple 
instances of use of disproportionate force to 
respond to public events.
the first of those was the response to the 
alternative inauguration rally held by presidential 
candidate raffi Hovannisian, who was protesting 
and rejecting the official elections results. the 
rally was followed by a march which was to 
head toward the presidential building. the police 
obstructed the march, detained two dozen 
people. Another two dozen were subjected to 
police violence, including Hovannisian’s Heritage 
party member Armen martirosyan who was 
occupied with calming the public response to the 
police.
Just as the police were critized by the public for 
these actions, they were also at the receiving end 
of criticism for their response to protestors at a 
construction site, arguing about the legality of the 
construction process. A policeman was accused 
of sexual assault for kissing a protestor on the 
neck, while holding her back. several people were 
While the prime minister 
and the archbishop denied 
knowledge of such holdings 
and transactions, the 
Attorney General of Cyprus, 
when in Armenia attending a 
meeting of chief prosecutors, 
categorically stated it is 
not possible to register a 
company in the name of 
an individual without that 
individual’s knowledge
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detained and later complained about the physical 
treatment they received in the police vehicles. 
those involved in the protests against the transport 
rate hike also joined those calling attention to 
police actions. in August, there was a protest 
rally-march against “massive police repression.”  
protestors pointed particularly to the absence of 
police response to the issues they’ve raised.
But the peak police response came on december 2, 
as russian president Vladimir putin made a one-day 
visit to Armenia. protestors had planned a series 
of events and in response the police, according 
to civil society representatives, obstructed free 
movement, freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly.
Again, the focus was on the march that was to start 
in freedom square. the police impeded movement, 
destroyed posters and banners, violently suppressed 
some protestors and detained others. over 100 
individuals, including journalists, were detained, 
often for periods longer than allowed by law.
on the positive side, reforms took hold. the 
police department reacts faster, better, more 
responsibly to public questions, specific items of 
criticism, and more frequent reviews in cases of 
illegitimate activities. there is marked improvement 
in assessing and collecting punitive fines and in 
dismissing wrongdoers from the force.
At the beginning of the year, the government 
adopted the police reform program. the program’s 
purpose is to make the police department 
more transparent, more accountable, improve 
police-public ties and cooperation, adopt the 
community-minded policing model throughout 
the country, use more efficient and modern tools 
to provide for public safety, clarify the transition 
from a police form to a special civil service 
division, and to codify special social allowances 
for those in police service. these and other 
changes are aimed at assuring accountability. 
Although many of these steps are being 
implemented, there is not yet visible improvement 
in the level of public trust.
reforming the police education system is also 
proceeding successfully. more attention is being 
paid to improve and enlarge skills and knowledge. 
the osce Yerevan office supports police reform 
programs. 
still, the reform program remained incomplete. 
in part, according to a formal statement where 
some items were removed entirely, others merely 
delayed, they cited the need for additional 
resources, which were not forthcoming either 
from local or international sources. Among those 
program items that will not be implemented are 
the adjustments to social security and pension 
payments for those in police service.
NGOs
even as the freedom of information center of 
Armenia published information about how grants 
were distributed by the president’s office, 19 
new grants were announced. the foi center 
had shown that from 2010 to 2013, from the 
presidential administrative budget, Armenia 
provided 500 million Amd ($1.2 million) to local 
ngos for institutional development and other 
purposes. this would not be a problem except 
that some of the ngos were not operational, some 
names at the managerial levels were repeated for 
several organizations.
the october announcement by the Armenian 
news foundation, itself an ngo supported by the 
presidential administration, of new grants applied 
to 19 organizations. nearly all coverage included 
reference to the earlier announcements about 
questionable distribution of funds.
ARMY
when, in the northeastern noyemberyan region, 
a recruit was killed and another received serious 
bodily harm, the parents of the dead soldier 
decided to carry the soldier’s body to the prime 
In 2013, civic activism 
continued to replace political 
party participation. The 
bulk of public participation 
revolved around issues which 
galvanized civic activists
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minister’s offices in Yerevan, as a sign of protest. 
As hundreds joined the journey, the police 
stopped the procession near sevan. the minister 
of defense and the chief of police personally 
spoke with the family, asking them not to follow 
through with such ‘extreme’ measures. minister 
seyran ohanian attended the funeral, promised 
to personally follow the investigation and assured 
the family that those guilty would be punished. 
six military officers, including the commander of 
the post, were dismissed.
in another widely-discussed incident, the head of 
the Vazgen sargsyan military institute resigned 
when a student was killed, at school.
in an effort to bring closure to a nine-year-
old criminal case, in may, the Appeals court 
overturned murder convictions on three young 
men. still, neither those responsible for the 
deaths nor those who pursued the convictions of 
the wrong men, were not identified.
these and other incidents throughout the year 
led civil society activists and some in the media 
insisted that these incidents should not be viewed 
individually, but as a systemic illness and the 
consequences of unsolved problems. Additionally, 
investigations are not carried out appropriately, 
commanders’ responsibility is not a factor, and by 
categorizing these deaths as suicides, the necessary 
objective and broad investigations are not carried out.
in an effort to deal with these incidents, the 
military prosecutor created a working group to 
study the effectiveness of investigations conducted 
in the case of non-combat deaths. representatives 
of five organizations joined the group. However, 
soon after, two organizations announced it would 
be impossible to continue to work within such 
a group given the prosecutor’s decision to stop 
the criminal investigation into the activities of 
the son of the governor of syunik marz. tigran 
Khachatryan and his security guard were accused 
in the death and beating of several xxx .  the 
organizations which left the working group 
said the one-sided statements of the prosecutor 
did not instill confidence that the study of the 
circumstances and causes of the army deaths would 
in fact not be objective and comprehensive.
when that same military prosecutor was later 
named prosecutor general, the public again blamed 
him for trying to cover up such incidents. the 
public and the press drew parallels between the 
release of the governor’s son, even as charges were 
levied against a former military officer who was 
clearly beaten in that incident, and the death at the 
hands of security guards of another military man, 
physician Vahe Avetyan, a year earlier – remarking 
on the assurance of impunity in both situations.
on the other hand, 2013 saw an increase in the 
number of corruption cases identified and punished.
still, the 2013 assessment of Amnesty 
international was that Armenia’s authorities do 
not tolerate criticism of the situation around the 
armed forces. the international human rights 
organizations noted harassment of journalists 
and advocates who focus on non-combat deaths. 
statement cited police chief Vladimir gasparyan 
who publicly called those who pursue this matter 
to be unpatriotic and indecent.
in August, conditions in the army was again 
a public topic, but this time because a soldier 
wandered into Azerbaijani-controlled territory 
and was apprehended. Hakob injighulyan was seen 
on Azerbaijani television criticizing conditions in 
the army, talking about corruption, and saying 
these were the reasons he crossed into Azerbaijan, 
ostensibly voluntarily.
the Armenian public ascribed his statements 
to physical and psychological pressure, and the 
Armenian authorities announced that the soldier 
would not be subject to criminal charges. 
On September 3, Armenia’s 
president unilaterally 
announced that Armenia would 
join the Russia-led Customs 
Union and not initial the 
European Union Association 
Agreement as the public had 
been led to believe for nearly 
four years, and longer
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in 2013, Azerbaijan’s use of sniper fire was so 
great that travel in Armenia was impacted. Both 
civil and military automobiles received fire. 
one soldier died, three were wounded. some 
roads were closed, others underwent renovation 
in order to offer alternatives and minimize the 
danger to civilians.
A series of sit-ins organized by former officers 
pointed to another of the army’s problems – 
providing sufficient social security, pensions and 
other staff needs. the protests lasted several 
months and took places in several cities. A 
few months into the actions, the leader of the 
protests was arrested on charges of fraud and 
embezzlement. His supporters called the charges 
and the arrest were politically motivated. A 
number of officers who had been awarded for 
their conduct during the Karabakh military 
conflict demonstrably returned their medals, in 
solidarity with the protesters.
An aspect of the same problems – low salaries, 
delayed pay raises – was the reason for an 
increasing number of officers resigning from the 
armed forces. this may have been the trigger 
for a six percent budget increase included in the 
2014 budget, which is to include a 10 percent 
salary hike for officers.
the annual draft of 18 years olds took place in 
the winter this year. it started in december and 
would end in January. the general assessment 
seemed to be that the whole process is smoother, 
and more transparent. posting sites were picked 
by lottery, in order to minimize the opportunity 
for corruption. the monitoring commission 
followed the process closely.
in other significant reforms, women were 
admitted for the first time to study at the 
sargsyan military institute and the Khanperyants 
military aviation institute. defense ministry 
officials noted this would improve the climate in 
the army, bring gender equality and that military 
service would be viewed differently.
finally, the alternative military service law was 
also modified. the cases against those who had 
applied for alternative service was dropped. 
According to the changes, alternative work 
service can be performed by anyone whose 
religion or convictions completely contradict the 
essence of military service. Alternative military 
service will be available to those whose faith 
prevents use of guns. the length of service was 
also shortened: Alternative military service period 
is 36 months the alternative work service period 
is 30 months.
the year saw the beginning of the second 
strategic defense review. the review will end in 
2015, and will articulate long-term assessment 
of the security environment around Armenia, 
and assure the necessary corresponding 
developments for a secure dynamic system by 
2020. the purpose is to develop a force that 
is capable of reacting to military aggression. 
thus the review will include identification nd 
assessment of military threats, development of 
potential scenarios, clarifying the issues facing 
the armed forces, planning for necessary military 
capacity, etc.
MEdIA
According to the freedom House freedom of 
the press index, Armenia’s media remain ‘not 
free’. in that the media market is still not self-
sustaining, and most media outlets depend 
on owners with either political or economic 
agendas, not much has changed. the rest depend 
on donor support.
As unilateral governance 
became the norm, public 
space shrank as well. 
According to Freedom 
House, the countries of the 
former Soviet Union (minus 
the Baltic States) are the 
only region in the world 
where political rights and 
civil liberties have been in 
decline since 2001. Armenia 
is no exception
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still, the number of online media outlets 
grew substantially. most aggregate the news, 
increasingly adding lifestyle information from 
non-Armenian sources as well, and either seeking 
advertising, or serving as portfolio for their 
owners or editors.
the existence of online media, especially its 
capacity to offer live broadcasts, changed the 
political landscape. the post-election period, 
raffi Hovannisian’s months-long challenge of 
the legitimacy of the election, would have 
gone unnoticed if broadcast media were the 
only source of information. But online media, 
specifically civilnet.tV — and later, one or two 
others as well —  offered continuous live coverage 
of the protests throughout the country, thus 
keeping the challenge alive and in people’s minds.
online media proliferated greatly and with the 
exception of a dozen or so sites which actually 
produce content, depend almost exclusively on 
material found elsewhere and repackaged. this 
became a sufficiently critical challenge for those 
who do invest resources in production such that 
about a dozen media organizations and sites 
together published the beginnings of a code of 
ethics and protection of copyright. it is too early 
to say whether publicly proclaiming the intention 
to defend one’s proprietary material will lead to a 
decline in the copy/paste sites.
social media – specifically facebook, and twitter 
to some lesser extent – are nearly the sole source 
of views for most online media sites. few outside 
the dozen or so larger sites have their own 
following. instead, they have views based on the 
successful promotion of a specific photo or story 
or headline.
But in 2013, it was not Armenian media’s dependent, 
‘not free’ status that stood out in readers’ minds. 
nor was it the preponderance of new, undefined 
sites. rather, Armenian media had found a new 
way to appear free, become popular and not ruffle 
political feathers – all at the same time.
media – especially online media – mastered 
the art of diversion. rather than focusing on 
the story at hand, they managed to divert the 
public’s attention from the issue to the margins. A 
letter by serj tankian, following the presidential 
election, calling on the newly-elected president 
for a new, vigorous effort to tackle social ills, was 
sidelined by artificial questions of authorship. the 
first visible effort by a name diasporan to engage 
in the public life of Armenia was ignored. the 
questions he raised were sidelined. instead, the 
historic moment was diluted to a series of jokes 
about ghost writing. 
An attempt was made to sideline an expose on 
offshore investments with the prime minister’s 
signature. By year’s end, when the issue had still 
not died, some media allowed themselves to be 
distracted by a prime minister intending to distract. 
media did not pick up on the seriousness of 
charges resulting from two in-depth articles 
published by foreign press.  the french-
based nouvelles d’Armenie magazine explored 
the identity of those who back the european 
friends of Armenia organization in Brussels, and 
demonstrating the organization’s mission to serve 
as a friend of Armenia’s leadership, the president 
especially, rather than a lobbying arm for the 
country.  As a follow-up to that article, the Los 
Angeles-based LA weekly published an article on 
the legal and illegal activities of a us-based and a 
moscow-based businessman who have been linked 
to various activities and expenditures in support 
of the president. Both articles were met with a 
resounding silence.
the entrance of Armenia’s second president in the 
discussion of Armenia’s economic and political 
Of all the ombudsman’s 
statements of the year, 
the report which received 
the most attention was a 
year-end special report on 
the judiciary, specifying 
problems with judicial 
proceedings, verdicts, double 
standards and especially a 
‘bribe pricelist’
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direction was dismissed the same way.  instead of 
questions about the substance of the claims and 
charges, the discussion devolved to one of timing.
media manipulation by authorities coupled with 
diversionary tactics willingly undertaken by 
media managers has resulted in maintaining the 
low level of trust regarding media. 
media’s willingness to comply with manipulation 
was also on display when the presidential 
inauguration ceremonies were broadcast. A rather 
cloudy April 9 turned up on television as a 
bright sunny day, with not a cloud in the sky, as 
footage pre-recorded on the previous sunday was 
broadcast, with a LiVe tag, ostensibly following 
the motorcade entrusted with delivering the 
bible from the state manuscripts Library to the 
inauguration site.
OUTLOOK
2013 came to a close in Armenia on one hand with 
the parliamentary majority securing the ratification 
of the controversial, sovereignty-limiting natural 
gas agreement, and on the other hand, with the 
unprecedented consolidation of opposition forces. 
this is a serious watershed which will continue to 
evolve and deepen during 2014.
the package of constitutional reforms will reveal 
the government’s attempts to perpetuate their 
grip on power. expected attempts to prepare for 
new footholds in power will most certainly lead 
to further political tension.
if the concessionary tone and approach of the 
natural gas agreement is any indication, all new 
legislation pertaining to the customs union will 
follow a similar logic. this will deepen the wedge 
between the majority and non-coalition parties 
in parliament and contribute to the further 
consolidation of alternative forces and efforts.
the weak democratic institutions of the customs 
union and the eurasian economic union will 
cast a shadow on the prospects of Armenia’s 
democratic development. this must create 
significant concern for the public, political and 
civil society forces, and the diaspora as well. 
in 2013 civic and public protests will continue against 
government abuses, worsening social conditions and 
the inadequacy of government responses. there will 
also be resistance against continuing attempts to 
fill state coffers by further taxing or pressuring the 
public, and not the oligopoly.
initial efforts to build bridges and reciprocal 
support between non-coalition parties and civil 
society organizations and activists will deepen for 
greater effectiveness.
A fragmented media will not have sufficient 
resources to adequately present and explain issues 
facing the Armenian public, leading to further 
hopelessness and lack of action. 
POLICY OPTIONS
despite its track record, the government must 
reconsider and realize the deepening political and 
social-economic crisis and take steps that will 
contribute to social unity and political inclusion 
and participation.  
the consolidation of opposition forces, the 
involvement of wide segments of the public, the 
media’s pockets of impartiality and vigilance 
together will demand greater transparency and 
accountability of the government, an acceptance 
of mistakes and serious efforts to right them.
in the absence of checks and balances in the 
country’s political system, it is imperative that 
political forces address the country’s urgent 
problems by proposing policies, acting as a 
counterweight to the authorities’ unilateral 
decisions both inside and outside the parliament 
on all issues of public interest. 
the government must begin to appropriately 
respond to the critical levels of out-migration 
(depopulation), before it becomes a threat to 
national security.  
the diaspora’s agenda must expand to include 
not only the issues of the genocide and nagorno 
Karabakh, but also the two urgent over-arching 
problems facing the country - halting migration 
and establishing the rule of law.
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“the global economy in 
2013 remained suspended 
between the poles of hope and 
uncertainty. while recovery 
gained momentum, particularly 
in some advanced economies, 
the world economy is not yet 
flying on all engines – and is 
likely to remain underpowered 
next year as well.” this is imf 
director christine Lagarde’s 
assessment the global economy’s 
performance in 2013, and ours 
as well.
indeed, the global economy experienced slow 
growth in 2013. despite the hopeful signs 
recorded in the third quarter, the imf in 
october scaled back its annual global growth 
projections. for 2013, the imf projected a 2.9 
percent growth (lowering its previous projection 
by 0.3 percentage points) and 3.6 percent 
growth for 2014.
three reasons can be identified for the 
slowdown in the global economy. the first is 
the possible tapering of the us federal reserve’s 
policy on quantitative easing. the second is 
the slowdown in china’s economic growth, 
something which might negatively impact 
commodity markets. the third is the existing 
debt problems in the eurozone, which is slowing 
growth in europe.
Although Armenia was affected by global 
developments, the impact was comparatively 
minor, given Armenia’s dependence on 
remittances from russia and commodity prices. 
copper, molybdenum and other ferrous metals 
comprise 60 percent of Armenia’s exports and 
the stable demand in global markets didn’t create 
any shocks for Armenian mining and metallurgical 
companies although there was a decline in 
revenues.
the price of copper in february was at a high 
$8,000, decreased to the year’s low of $6565 
in July, and beginning in August, rose again 
to $7100. the price of molybdenum hovered 
around $20,000 per ton and in december 
increased to over $21,000. copper, molybdenum 
and other colored metals comprised 60 percent 
of Armenia’s exports. sustained demand by 
international markets resulted in stable sales 
for mining and metallurgy companies, although 
total revenues saw a certain decline.
russia, Armenia’s important trade partner, saw 
its economic growth decline to 1.5 percent.  
however that did not impact the level of 
remittances from russia to Armenia. energy 
prices remained high throughout the year, 
russia’s revenues thus remained high and led to 
high demand in russia’s economy. this in turn 
benefitted Armenian exports to russia. russia’s 
healthy economy also fed the demand for migrant 
laborers, the source of much of the remittances. 
As a result, in the first 10 months of the year, 
the total volume of transfers into Armenia 
(74.4 percent of which is received from russia) 
exceeded $1.8 billion, which is a record compared 
to previous years.
the drop in global food prices, too, was favorable 
for Armenia. Armenia, a large importer of food 
products, is sensitive to price fluctuations for 
grain, vegetable oil, dairy and sugar. According 
to the un food and Agriculture organization, the 
food product price index for november was 4.4 
percent lower than the index for the previous 
year.  
Armenia’s economy was not critically affected by 
international developments. Yet the government 
attempted to explain away Armenia’s chronic and 
deepening macroeconomic problems by external 
factors.
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THE ECONOMIC PICTURE
Just as with its global projections, during the 
year, the imf lowered its projections for Armenia 
as well. As of october, the imf’s annual growth 
projection for 2013 gdp growth was 4.6 percent, 
compared to the 5.1 percent at the beginning of 
the year. for 2014, the imf is projecting growth at 
4.8 percent, compared to the earlier 5.3 percent. 
According to the imf, Armenia’s growth is 
expected to decelerate this coming year because 
of the increase in natural gas and electricity 
prices, slower growth in the agricultural sector 
in 2013 after a strong performance in 2012 
which was conditioned by favorable weather and 
periodicity of agricultural crops.
According to world Bank assessments, Armenia’s 
economic growth will hover around 3-4 percent. 
Armenia’s government is also not optimistic. the 
2013 state budget was based on an expectation of 
6.2 percent economic growth. But the year ended 
with 4.1 percent growth. Yet at the beginning 
of the year, the government was so sure of the 
higher growth rate, that in march, the president 
stated he expected the government to secure 7 
percent economic growth or they would resign. 
neither happened.
Armenia’s macroeconomic environment in 2013 
remained unstable. the decrease in economic 
activity was accompanied by high inflation, severe 
decrease in investments and a cut in real wages. 
while the first quarter saw 7.5 percent growth, 
the aggregate for the first three quarters was 2.6 
percent. the main driver of economic growth was 
agriculture. despite the fact that Armavir saw 
unprecedented quantities of hail which destroyed 
most or all of the crops in 41 communities, end-
of-year statistics showed 5.9 percent growth 
for the agricultural sector. Armavir’s farmers 
blocked roads between their towns and Yerevan, 
demanding government support. the prime 
minister promised the development of an anti-
hail system for Armavir, as well as supported an 
extension of loan repayments, and the creation of 
a support fund for farmers.
According to the national statistical service, 
the economic slowdown had begun before the 
increase in imported natural gas prices; in 
the second quarter, gdp growth was a scant 
0.6 percent. private investment has decreased 
steadily for the past five years, which is one 
of the most important contributors to the 
slowdown in growth. the ratio of investment to 
gdp was 40.9 percent in 2008; in 2012 it was 
23.8 percent and in 2013 it fell yet again to 22.5 
percent. According to the central Bank, private 
investment in 2013 will show a decrease of 
seven percent, instead of the projected increase 
of one percent.
the decrease in foreign investment is substantial. 
in the first three quarters of 2013, foreign 
investment decreased by 31.7 percent, and foreign 
direct investment by 62.1 percent. even during 
the 2009 crisis, foreign investment did not see 
such a drop. with the exception of the north-
south corridor construction project financed by 
the Asian development Bank, not a single major 
infrastructure program was undertaken in 2013. 
the groundbreaking for a major joint power 
plant project (estimated to cost $350 million) in 
meghri, by the Armenian and iranian governments 
took place in november, 2012 but construction 
has not yet begun.
Beginning in June, the inflation rate surpassed 
the acceptable level (4±1,5 percent) defined by 
the central Bank. when the public services 
regulatory commission increased the prices for 
natural gas and electricity on July 7, inflation 
was already higher than the acceptable rate. 
By August, the inflation rate was above nine 
percent, which forced the central Bank to raise 
policy rates. the central Bank estimated that 
the increase in natural gas and electricity prices 
directly and indirectly affected inflation by three 
percent. price increases for dairy, eggs, potatoes 
and vegetables also affected the rate of inflation.
Although Armenia 
was affected by global 
developments, the impact 
was comparatively minor, 
given Armenia’s dependence 
on remittances from Russia 
and commodity prices
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given the high level of market centralization for 
food products in Armenia, the significant decline 
in the international price of grains, oil, and 
sugar had either no impact, or delayed impact on 
Armenian prices. the drop in the domestic price 
of sugar, on the other hand, was twice the decline 
in world prices.
poverty remains an acute problem. the rate of 
inflation in the second quarter continued to 
steadily surpass the pace of wage hikes, leading 
to a decline in real wages and a decline in 
purchasing power. this compounded the country’s 
already deepening socio-economic problems. 
According to the national statistical service, 
32.4 percent of the population of Armenia lived 
in poverty in 2012; 13.5 percent of those are 
considered very poor and 2.8 percent, extremely 
poor. Although the 2012 rate is lower than the 35 
percent of 2011, compared to 2008 indicators, it is 
4.8 percent higher. the extreme poverty rate has 
increased faster than the general rates of poverty. 
in 2012, extreme poverty rate was nearly double 
that of 2008.  
emigration and labor migration continue to 
remain the main tools of poverty reduction. 
According to a survey conducted by the national 
statistical service, 29,000 people who left as 
labor migrants between 2009-2012 did not return 
to Armenia. this trend persisted in 2013.
following its appointment in may, the new 
government adopted a program which placed 
special emphasis on unemployment through job 
creation and the development of human capital and 
institutions. it also focused on increasing salaries 
and combating migration. the opposition criticized 
the program as unrealistic and insufficient.
rumors about the actual price of natural gas 
imports from russia continued to remain the 
focus of political intrigue. Although government 
officials denied price increases, published reports 
by Armenia’s customs Agency demonstrated that 
Armenia in 2011 had imported natural gas from 
russia for $198; in 2012 for $232 and in the first 
half of 2013 for $253 per 1000 cubic meters.
By the end of 2013, it became clear that the 
public and the legislators were indeed kept in 
the dark. the price of gas had been increased 
immediately prior to Armenia’s february 2013 
presidential election. for political reasons, the 
government quietly subsidized the increase to 
prevent adverse public reaction. it was not until 
may, Armrusgazprom, the Armenian-russian 
gas consortium, announced that the russian 
gazprom would supply Armenia with natural 
gas at $270 per 1000 cubic meters, in place of 
the officially announced $180. After september 
3, when Armenia expressed its wish to join 
the customs union, hopes rose regarding an 
agreement surrounding the price of gas. A final 
agreement was signed when russian president 
Vladimir putin came to Armenia on december 
2. However, it became painfully clear that 
Armenia had already accrued a $300 million 
debt to the russians. the minister of energy 
and natural resources announced that the price 
of imported natural gas had in fact increased 
from $180 from 2011, and the debt had 
accumulated over the past three years. that 
public debt was paid off in the december 2 
agreement, with Armenia selling its 20 percent 
remaining share in Armrusgasprom.
soon after, the ambassador of iran, Armenia’s 
other gas supplier, announced that, although 
the Armenian government had not asked, his 
country is ready to supply Armenia with gas 
at a lower price. However, he indicated that 
iran may no longer be willing to provide gas in 
exchange for electricity. this, despite a current 
arrangement by which iranian imported natural 
gas costs $181, and Armenia pays by exporting 
3 kilowatt/hours of electricity against 1 cubic 
meter of natural gas.
Armenia’s economy was 
not critically affected by 
international developments. 
Yet the government 
attempted to explain away 
Armenia’s chronic and 
deepening macroeconomic 
problems by external factors
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
According to the doing Business 2014 
report published by the world Bank and the 
international finance corporation, Armenia 
ranked 37th among 189 countries, compared 
with 40th the previous year. Armenia registered 
progress in tax collection, company registrations, 
and contract enforcement indices. it registered a 
relapse in six indicators, including construction 
permits, electricity access, loan eligibility, 
property registration, investor protection and 
international trade. its position for bankruptcy 
regulation remained the same.
the reduction in the number of mandatory tax 
reports was a positive development in 2013. 
nevertheless the country’s ranking of 103 still 
reflects unnecessarily complex tax administration.
2013 brought to the fore the not-so-secret 
phenomena impeding business development. 
the entry into the Armenian market of the 
french supermarket chain carrefour was 
continually delayed due to obstruction by those 
who currently hold a dominant position in the 
market. in a world Bank report, monopolization 
in Armenia is the highest in the cis and eastern 
europe. According to the report, monopolies, 
oligopolies and other dominant players constitute 
60 percent of Armenia’s markets. the world Bank 
considers such a high degree of concentration as 
an obstacle to economic growth.
perhaps in response, the Anti-trust commission 
was granted additional powers and enlarged 
the scope of fines and procedures within its 
scope. However, its efforts to prevent and 
oversee absorption and market exclusion are 
insufficient. state procurement auditing processes 
are fragmentary, although these are among the 
fundamental means of restricting competition. 
overall, restricting competition in Armenia 
remains a systemic risk.
Armenia fell four places, to 79 out of 148 
countries, with a score of 4.1 (where 7 is highly 
competitive) in the global competitiveness index 
which measures the institutions, policies, and 
factors that determine the level of productivity of 
a country. specifically on labor market efficiency, 
as an aspect of competitiveness, Armenia ranks 
50, behind georgia, ahead of russia. in quality of 
higher education and training, Armenia ranks 77, 
behind russia and ahead of georgia.
in may, the imf, too, invited attention to the 
lack of competition. in a  published a review of 
Armenia’s economy, Armenia’s country director 
and the head of the imf Armenia mission urged 
the state “to do more to collect taxes; to do more 
to ensure that its spending is efficient, transparent, 
and gets to the right places; to ensure that public 
resources are not used to rescue private firms that 
have been poorly managed.” they advise that the 
government shift from words to action and open 
the market for competition.
NEw PENSION POLICY
in 2014, Armenia will implement a new, multilevel 
pension system. those born after January 1, 1974, 
must participate in a mandatory pension system. 
for those born earlier, participation is optional.
thus, Armenia’s pension system is four-tiered. 
the first tier is the social pension which will 
be provided to those with up-to-five years of 
employment history. the second tier covers those 
who have worked for more than five years and 
who have contributed to the social pension fund. 
the third tier is the mandatory system and the 
fourth is the voluntary fund.
the voluntary system has been in place since 
2011; however, neither individuals nor financial 
institutions have demonstrated serious interest. 
As of october 2013, only a few dozen voluntary 
Armenia’s macroeconomic 
environment in 2013 
remained unstable. The 
decrease in economic 
activity was accompanied 
by high inflation, severe 
decrease in investments and 
a cut in real wages
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pension accounts have been opened. the mandatory 
system applies to employees (excluding those in 
active military service), individual entrepreneurs and 
notary publics. five percent of gross income will 
be transferred by the employer to the employee’s 
compulsory account; the state will contribute an 
additional five percent but not more than 25,000 
Amd. if the citizen’s income exceeds 500,000 Amd/
month, s/he must, by law, pay the difference up to a 
total of 10 percent of gross income.
Although the law on pension funds was ratified in 
2010, protests against the new system began only 
this year, as the mandatory provision was about 
to enter into force. in october, those working 
in the it sector — among the highest paid 
professionals —  began mobilizing, demanding 
changes in the legislation and a postponement of 
the introduction of the new system. employees 
from other sectors also joined in.
the main grievances come from those whose 
employment and salaries are fully legally registered. 
in 2013, the unified payroll tax was around  25 
percent on average. thus, with the pension payment, 
total withholdings will reach 31 percent. for those 
with a monthly salary exceeding  500,000 Amd, 
that amount will be even higher. for those who 
earn one million Amd, withholdings will exceed 
33 percent,  7.5 percent of which is the mandatory 
pension payment. even for those who are paid well, 
this new system will impact real wages.
At the crux of these grievances, is a fundamental 
lack of trust. for the new system to be viable, 
long-term financial and political stability is 
necessary, and under the present climate, this 
cannot be taken for granted. the legislation 
foresees that 60 percent of funds must be 
invested in Armenia, either with companies listed 
on the Armenian stock exchange, nasdaq omx 
Armenia, or in Armenian government bonds. since 
the number of companies that qualify are very 
limited, the bulk of the funds will be invested in 
government bonds. Any serious shock or upheaval 
will necessarily impact the value of these bonds.  
the high yield of government bonds remains an 
obstacle to the development of capital markets. 
nasdaq omx Armenia capitalization amounted 
to about 63 billion Amd as of october 2013, and 
the volume of share transactions in the first 10 
months amounted to 1.5 billion Amd; two to 
three transactions are conducted monthly. Bond 
turnover is ten times less than share turnover. it 
is in this climate that pension funds will cumulate 
about 50 billion Amd annually.
if this climate results in the central Bank’s 
allowing a higher percentage of pension funds to 
be invested outside of the country, then pension 
fund reforms will have a minimal impact on 
economic growth. two companies have been 
chosen as pension fund managers: Amundi-AcBA 
Asset management, a joint venture of the french 
Amundi Asset management, and the Armenia-
based AcBA credit Agricole Bank and the 
c-QuAdrAt Ampega Asset management Armenia, 
a joint venture of the german talanx Asset 
management and the Austrian c-QuAdrAt.
the pension law, which passed prior to 
Armenia’s indication that it would join the 
russian-led customs union, stipulates that 
pension funds can only be used to purchase 
securities issued by member states of the 
european union and the organization for 
economic cooperation and development (oecd). 
none of the members of the customs union 
are members of the oecd, although russia and 
Kazakhstan are taking active steps to develop 
their capital markets. it is expected that 
Armenia will be subjected to pressures to allow 
securities issued by countries of the customs 
union.  
The decrease in foreign 
investment is substantial. 
In the first three quarters 
of 2013, foreign investment 
decreased by 31.7 percent, 
and foreign direct 
investment by 62.1 percent. 
Even during the 2009 crisis, 
foreign investment did not 
see such a drop
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in november, opposition factions in the national 
Assembly — the prosperous Armenia party, 
the Armenian revolutionary federation - 
dashnaktsutyun, the Armenian national congress and 
the Heritage party — joined in a appeal to convene 
a special session on the possibility of postponing 
implementation of the mandatory pension component 
by one year. the republican party and its coalition 
partner, the rule of Law party, boycotted the special 
session. However due to continuing public pressure, 
the issue was placed on the agenda at a regular 
session. it did not pass. the opposition parties have 
appealed to the constitutional court.
CIvIL AvIATION
on April 1, Armavia, the sole Armenian carrier, 
suspended all flights and declared bankruptcy, 
thus ending its 12-year monopoly. Bad 
management and the activation of alternate flights 
by russian and european carriers were cited as 
the main reasons for its demise. while enjoying 
exclusivity for many years, Armavia was not able 
to compete. According to public documents, in 
2010-2012, Armavia owed 21.5 billion Amd in 
state air taxes. of that amount, 5.5 billion in 
taxes and 16 billion in penalties.
At the request of Armenia’s national 
competitiveness foundation, mckinsey & company 
developed policy recommendations to enhance the 
competitiveness in the air transport sector. they 
proposed that Armenia completely liberalize the 
air transport sphere and move toward an open 
skies policy. According to estimates by mckinsey, 
that policy would, over three to four years, secure 
gdp growth of $300 to $400 million, contribute 
to the creation of 18,000 to 23,000 new jobs 
in the tourism and aviation sectors, increase 
passenger travel by 20 to 25 percent and lead to a 
10 percent reduction in ticket prices. 
in october, the government issued a strategy 
paper adopting a competitive and consistent air 
transport services policy, appearing to be heading 
towards open skies. it specified that any airline 
that could secure minimum technical standards, 
could begin flights to and from Armenia. one new 
carrier, Air Armenia, immediately began limited 
but regular service.
EUROBONdS
in september, Armenia issued its first-ever 
eurobonds valued at $700 million, with a 7-year 
maturity and 6.25 percent yield. from that sale, 
$450 million was used to repay the $500 million 
loan from russia (outstanding from 2009) prior to 
its maturity.
using proceeds from the sale of the eurobonds 
to repay the russian loan earlier than scheduled 
was not uniformly welcomed by professionals.the 
russian loan had a maturity of 15 years, with 
a Libor+3 interest rate. in september 2013, a 
six-month Libor was 0.73 percent. However, the 
russian loan assumed repayments of about $60 
million annually, something which had troubled 
the government. the government must now pay 
$42 million annually in interest payments to 
service the eurobonds.
in november 2013, Armenia’s foreign debt 
exceeded $3.7 billion, 18.5 percent of which for 
the eurobonds. in 2013, Armenia hit the peak 
in the external debt repayment schedule, which 
are estimated to be about $220 million. it is 
anticipated that foreign debt in 2013 will be 39.5 
percent of gdp. in 2008, state foreign debt was 
13.5 percent of gdp, in 2009 it was 34.3 percent 
and in 2012, it was 35.2 percent.
BUdGET  
the 2013 state budget was formed based on the 
following macroeconomic projections: 6.2 percent 
Poverty remains an acute 
problem. The rate of 
inflation in the second 
quarter continued to steadily 
surpass the pace of wage 
hikes, leading to a decline in 
real wages and a decline in 
purchasing power
47
CIVILITAS FOUNDATIONARMENIA 2013
ILLUSIVE growth
economic growth, four percent inflation, 3.2 
percent deflator. the ratio of the budget deficit 
to gdp was forecast to be about 2.6 percent. this 
meant that compared to previous years, a more 
contractionary policy would be implemented. it 
was assumed that the economy had overcome 
the crisis and had entered a period of sustainable 
growth, therefore it would be possible to strike a 
delicate balance between economic growth and 
financial stability.
Based on this macroeconomic forecast, budget 
revenues were expected to reach 1.033 trillion 
Amd ($2.55 billion or 22.76 percent of gdp), 
expenditures to reach 1.153 trillion Amd  ($2.84 
billion or 25.4 percent of gdp), and the deficit 
would hit 120 billion Amd  (2.64 percent of gdp). 
tax collectors would be obliged to collect an 
additional (in addition to what?) 115 billion Amd 
in taxes.
However, during the course of the year, signs 
of macroeconomic instability emerged, which 
impacted budget implementation. economic 
activity indices continually decreased over 
the course of the year. By october, growth 
registered at 3.4 percent. According to the 
national statistical service, by the third quarter 
of 2013, compared to the same time period of 
the previous year, gdp had increased by only 1.4 
percent with agriculture playing the biggest role, 
contributing to growth by 1.1 percentage points. 
the government’s year-end forecasts place gdp 
growth for 2013 at about 4.1 percent.
with a decrease in economic activity, ensuring 
revenue for the state budget becomes a complex 
problem, even if administrative capabilities are 
strengthened. However, throughout the year, the 
finance ministry continually announced that they 
had been able to secure almost 100 percent tax 
collection. in reality, this was due exclusively to 
higher inflation. thus, the deflator was higher than 
predicted. the increase in cost of manufactured 
products between January and october, compared 
to the same period in 2012, was 4.8 percent, and 
freight rates grew by seven percent.
during the year, the rise in prices of consumer 
goods exceeded nine percent and as of november 
was 6.6 percent. in this unprecedented 
atmosphere of inflation, it was expected that 
budget revenue, in absolute numbers, would 
exceed projections. Because this did not happen, 
the share of budget revenues as portion of gdp 
decreased.
According to data for the first nine months, 
budget revenue was 786 billion Amd, 94.4 
percent of which came from taxes and fees.
on the revenue side of the 2013 budget, two 
new types of taxes were introduced – a unified 
income tax and a turnover tax. the unified 
income tax replaced payments for income tax 
and mandatory social insurance. for the first nine 
months, income was 177.5 billion Amd (about 
24 percents of all tax revenue), of which 24.4 
percent exceeded the previous year’s income tax 
and social insurance payments taken together.  
taxes on total turnover comprised 1.2 percent 
of all revenue, or about 9.1 billion Amd. this tax 
was applied to those small and medium sized 
businesses whose total turnover during the course 
of one year does not exceed 58.35 million Amd.
As with previous years,  the main bulk of tax 
revenues came from the Value Added tax — 
40.4 percent. moreover, the role of this tax is 
increasing with each passing year. some 64 
By the end of 2013, it 
became clear that the 
public and the legislators 
were indeed kept in the 
dark. The price of gas had 
been increased immediately 
prior to Armenia’s February 
2013 presidential election. 
For political reasons, 
the government quietly 
subsidized the increase 
to prevent adverse public 
reaction
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percent of Value Added tax is obtained from 
border taxation and in this regard, this increase 
continues to exceed revenues from domestic 
turnover.
the other important source of revenue for the 
state budget is profit tax, which comprises 13 
percent of tax revenue. However, growth of profit 
tax remittances is less than the growth of VAt 
remittances. surprisingly, the volume of profit 
tax is also less than the volume of income tax 
remittances. this is fundamentally conditioned by 
large companies concealing their profit.
state budget expenditures during the course of 
the year have been marked by shortfalls of  about 
15 percent. instead of the forecast 870 billion 
Amd expenditures, in the first nine months, 740 
billion Amd was actually spent. this shortfall 
affected primarily capital expenditures, which 
fell to 50 percent. for example, only half the 
financing for apartment building construction and 
utilities was utilized because foreign financing 
for improvements in the water supply system for 
shirak, Lori and Yerevan was either not used or 
was only partially used. About $25 million was 
not spent, but with no explanation as to why 
these funds were frozen.
with capital expenditures postponed, the budget 
registered a marked surplus. in the first nine 
months, the budget had a surplus of 75.8 billion 
Amd, compared to the anticipated 9.5 billion. the 
unspent balance of the budget did not go below 
110 billion Amd, rising to 130 billion in september. 
the shortfall in capital expenditures had a 
negative affect on the rate of economic growth 
because of its contractional nature. According to 
preliminary assessments, in the first nine months 
of the year, the amount not spent from the state 
budget equalled almost four percent of gdp.
OUTLOOK
despite the international monetary fund’s 
optimistic projections for economic growth in 
the united states, the european union and other 
developed countries, growth projections are 
less optimistic for russia’s economy, which is of 
huge significance for Armenia. in 2014, growth 
in russia will depend on the price of oil. global 
economic growth should spur higher oil prices. 
However, growing energy sufficiency in the us 
and the possible easing of sanctions on iranian oil 
exports may override the growth factor pushing 
prices downward. if the price of oil were to drop 
below $85 per barrel, russia’s economy would 
face serious challenges, which in turn will have 
negative repercussions for Armenia.
Armenia’s growth outlook is uncertain. president 
sargsyan’s seven percent growth expectation did not 
materialize. the economy grew by about 4 percent. 
chances of meeting the projected five percent 
growth in the 2014 budget is low. the increase in 
budgetary expenses will result in an increase in 
the tax burden that will inhibit investments and 
demand, impeding economic growth.
the implementation of the new mandatory 
cumulative pension system will negatively impact 
consumer demand and other administrative 
payments that will begin in 2014.
the 2014 budget is contractionary. there are no 
state investments, the tax burden is excessive and 
the supply of Amd in circulation is limited. Year-
end attempts to depreciate Amd will not stimulate 
investments or economic growth because there are 
no mechanisms for the depreciation would impact 
commercial interest rates. the business sector has 
negative expectations. taking into consideration 
the high risk in the economy, bank loan terms 
continue to remain, high, stringent and limited.
2013 brought to the fore the 
not-so-secret phenomena 
impeding business 
development. The entry into 
the Armenian market of the 
French supermarket chain 
Carrefour was continually 
delayed due to obstruction 
by those who currently hold 
a dominant position in the 
market
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Armenia’s economy will experience adverse effects 
from the moment of its membership in the customs 
union. the customs union is by definition a free 
trade zone with common customs regulation. 
Armenia has always had free trade with russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan within the framework of 
the cis. when common customs regulations kick 
in, taking into consideration that the customs needs 
and interests of russia and Armenia could not be 
more divergent, its impact on Armenia’s economy 
will not be good. it is also possible that in 2014, 
certain members of the world trade organization 
may challenge Armenia’s moves within the customs 
union, seriously impeding Armenia’s trade relations 
with its partners.
By refusing to initial the european union’s 
Association Agreement and the deep and 
comprehensive free trade Agreement, Armenia 
lost an opportunity to benefit from a 500 million 
strong market with enormous purchasing capacity. 
Armenia will most probably be deprived from the 
donors conference previously envisaged to provide 
budget support to Armenia.
POLICY OPTIONS
to secure economic growth, the government must 
utilize domestic resources. if the government 
does not retreat from the mandatory cumulative 
pension system, then at the very least, the 
revenue collected and invested in government 
bonds should be directed not at financing current 
expenses, but toward long-term programs, which 
will secure economic growth and create new jobs.
to spur economic growth, the government must 
speed up the construction of the north-south 
corridor being funded through loans by the Asian 
development Bank.
with the objective of elevating consumer and 
investor trust, the government must realize 
systemic reforms, which also include the 
separation of business and politics.
the government must not only declare but 
practice expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies. under conditions of the mandatory 
cumulative pension system, controlling inflation 
in the mid-term and long-term is extremely 
important, however in the short term, preference 
must be given to the more critical needs of the 
country, namely economic growth, job creation 
and poverty reduction.
taking into consideration the failure to initial the 
european union’s Association Agreement and the 
deep and comprehensive free trade Agreement 
and the loss of trust toward Armenia by european 
investors, the government must dramatically 
improve the business environment and not only 
by advancing in international rankings, but 
actually by attracting new investors and stopping 
the outflow of capital.
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THe regiOn in figUreS
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN GEORGIA
gdp growth: 
4.6 percent
inflation 
(annual 
average):  
7 percent
gdp:  
$10.4 bn
gdp per 
capita: 
$3176
population: 
3.0 m*
gdp growth: 
3.5 percent
inflation 
(annual 
average):  
3.7 percent
gdp:  
$76.0 bn
gdp per 
capita: 
$8165
population: 
9.3 m
gdp growth: 
2.5 percent
inflation 
(annual 
average):  
0.3 percent
gdp:  
$16.0 bn
gdp per 
capita: 
$3558
population: 
4.5 m
After elections, president 
sargsyan’s first foreign 
trip was to moscow. 
Armenia, having negoti-
ated with the european 
union for two and a half 
years, expressed its 
intention to join the 
customs union. Because 
of Armenia’s lack of 
clear vision and foreign 
policy anchor, it will 
continue to fall victim to 
the implications of those 
contradictions.
taking into consider-
ation the failure to initial 
the european union’s 
Association Agreement 
and the deep and com-
prehensive free trade 
Agreement and the loss 
of trust toward Armenia 
by european investors, 
the government must 
dramatically improve the 
business environment 
and not only by advanc-
ing in international 
rankings, but actually by 
attracting new investors 
and stopping the outflow 
of capital.
government must take 
steps to reduce out-
migration (depopulation), 
before it becomes a na-
tional security threat.
.
Afer elections president 
margvelashvili’s first for-
eign trip was to Vilnius.
georgia became the only 
country in the south 
caucasus that took the 
next step towards euro-
pean integration.
despite a less aggressive 
russia policy, condi-
tions to overcome the 
tbilisi-moscow crisis are 
not present. georgia is 
determined to continue 
its european integra-
tion policy, which russia 
views as expansion by 
the eu and nAto into its 
sphere of influence. 
russia will not retreat 
from its recognition of 
Abkhazia and south os-
setia, therefore serious 
progress in georgian-Ab-
khaz and georgian-south 
ossetian negotiations will 
not take place.
After his re-election, 
president Aliyev’s first 
foreign trip was to 
Ankara.
during president putin’s 
visit to Baku, rosneft 
and socar  signed two 
important agreements. 
Azerbaijan bought from 
russia $1 billion in arma-
ments. 
Azerbaijan agreed to 
export shah deniz 2 gas 
thru two pipelines to eu-
rope, through turkey. 
in 2014, Azerbaijan will 
continue to water down 
and pull back from 
madrid principles, where 
the right of the people 
of nagorno Karabagh is 
explicitly codified.
 
* Armenia’s population figure is based on the 2011 census conducted by the national statistical service of Armenia.
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THe regiOn in figUreS
RUSSIA TURKEY IRAN
gdp growth: 
1.5 percent
inflation 
(annual 
average):  
6.7 percent
gdp: 
$2.117 bn
gdp per 
capita: 
$14973
population: 
141,4 m
gdp growth: 
3.8 percent
inflation 
(annual 
average):  
7.7 percent
gdp:  
$821.8 bn
gdp per 
capita: 
$10745
population: 
76.5 m
gdp growth: 
1.5 percent
inflation 
(annual 
average): 
42.3 percent
gdp:  
$388.5 bn
gdp per 
capita: 
$5039
population: 
77.1 m
russia registered serious 
foreign policy successes. 
ukraine did not sign the 
Association Agreement; 
relations with georgia 
saw a thaw; relations with 
Azerbaijan deepened.   
russia’s engagement in 
iran’s and syria’s affairs 
were deemed construc-
tive, even from a western 
perspective.
russia-turkey relations 
has reached a level of 
strategic cooperation. 
thus, Armenia’s strategic 
partner russia, has elevat-
ed its relationship with 
Azerbaijan and turkey to 
unprecedented levels.
turkey ended the year 
with serious internal up-
heaval. the government’s 
response to mid-year 
protests introduced new 
tension in turkish-eu 
relations.
with no serious progress 
in relations with neigh-
bors, Ankara initiated 
a reconciliation process 
with its Kurdish popula-
tion and with pKK.
Although turkey will 
be preoccupied with its 
domestic troubles and up-
coming elections, it will 
continue to feign readi-
ness for concessions and 
closer relations with Ar-
menia. on the threshold 
of the 100th anniversary 
of the Armenian geno-
cide, it will be extremely 
important for Ankara 
to create the illusion of 
establishing relations 
and thereby discourag-
ing the international 
community from making 
statements. Armenia, 
taking into consideration 
the diaspora factor and 
its recent miscalculations 
on relations with turkey, 
will try not to be pulled 
into Armenian-turkish 
processes.
A thaw in iran-us and 
iran-west relations may 
occur if iran’s civil and 
spiritual rulers and the 
west are mindful of the 
expectations and interests 
of the other side.
iran has made concessions 
in its nuclear program, 
has adopted more flexible 
posture on the syrian 
conflict and has put it 
relations with turkey at a 
new level.
Armenian-iranian rela-
tions continue to remain 
at a high level, despite 
joint economic projects 
progressing at snail’s 
pace.
data is from “world economic outlook: coping with High debt and sluggish growth”, imf, october 2012. 
source: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/pdf/text.pdf 
Armenia-related data was later revised by imf.
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